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4Abstract
In this paper we analyse the consequences of replacing government subsidies with a graduate tax
(GT) or income contingent loan (ICL) system for the nancing of higher education. Both these
systems are directed towards solving capital and insurance market failures. We constructed an
empirically based simulation model to analyse loans, GT's and ICL systems of education nance.
We considered various nancing regimes that differ in: i) the extent to which non-repayment or
default risks are pooled or shifted towards society; and ii) the level of education subsidies. We
show that the switch to a GT or ICL system can signicantly reduce the income risks that
graduates would experience under an articially constructed loan system. A reduction in
government outlays of about 2.5 billion euro. would result if education subsidies are dropped to
zero. The tax rate in a GT would then have to be about 6% on average. In an ICL system with full
risk pooling the repayment rate would be higher, ranging from 10%-6%, depending on the size
of the default/solidarity premium on the interest rate. If default risks are shifted to society the
repayment rate may be lower, but this goes at a cost of a smaller reduction in government
outlays. Under a risk-shifting regime, the government encounters diminishing savings on
outlays because reducing ex ante subsidies on education subsidies, increases the costs of default
(ex post subsidies). Replacing ex ante subsidies with ex post subsidies makes the resulting
distribution of incomes more equal because only those with low life-time incomes benet from
ex post subsidies. We discuss behavioural responses and policy implications.
Key words: education nance, graduate taxes, income contingent loans, education subsidies,
government expenditures on education.
JEL-codes: H24, H52, H82, I22, I28.
561 Introduction
[...] Existing loan or loan guarantee programs are too restricted in their terms, length of
repayment period, and size of the loan, to offer many lower- and middle-class young
people an opportunity to borrow against future earnings to the extent necessary to achieve
adequate levels of demand even for the educational services of virtually free public
institutions. (Nerlove, 1972, p. S185).
In this paper we analyse the consequences of replacing education subsidies on higher education
with an equity participation scheme of nancing higher education. We analyse various nancing
schemes - graduate taxes (GT) and income contingent loans (ICL) - in order to channel private
resources into higher education without harming accessibility. Our focus is fourfold. First, we
study the nancial consequences for students/graduates of these new nancing schemes. To that
end we try to quantify the (re)payment conditions. Second, we analyse the insurance
characteristics of the equity participation schemes. Third, we address the potential gains in terms
of saved government revenue of these policy switches. Fourth, we discuss the qualitative
consequences for the distribution of incomes.
We think that the subject is relevant for the following reasons. First of all, most governments
in Western countries spend a lot of resources on higher education. Nevertheless, government
budgets for education are under pressure for various reasons, such as the ageing of the
population and the EMU-criteria for decits and debt. At the same time, enrolment in higher
education has been steadily increasing in recent decades. This has caused a crisis in the funding
of higher education, see for example Kane (1997), Barr (1998) and Barr and Crawford (1998).
Policy interest in alternative ways of nancing education has increased as governments seek ways
to control outlays. In particular, policymakers may look for ways to increase private contributions
since subsidising education while enrolment rates remain increasing does not resolve funding
problems. Indeed, the only way to circumvent pressures on government budgets is to increase
private contributions to higher education, given that there are limitations on the amount of tax
revenues that can be spend on subsidies for higher education. However, a major concern with
raising private contributions is that accessibility to higher education needs to be warranted.
In addition, it is argued that current higher education nance is inequitable.1 The
unfortunate by-product of subsidies on education is that they imply reverse redistribution. The
incidence of the costs is born by the average taxpayer, whereas the benets accrue to the most
talented part of the nation. To put it in Arrow's (1971) terms, subsidies for higher education are
`input' regressive, since only the students with the highest abilities within a cohort benet from
1 This is a long standing debate, see e.g. Friedman (1962), Nerlove (1972, 1975), or Schultz (1972) for early contribu-
tions.
7these subsidies because they learn most. As a consequence, socio-economic outcomes are more
regressive as well. The reason is that initial differences in abilities become more pronounced
because the highest ability students can increase their ability to earn income through education.
Additionally, the larger part of students enrolled in higher education already belong to the most
wealthy families. The Social and Cultural Planning Ofce in the Netherlands has shown that the
50% wealthiest families receive 80% of education expenditures on higher education (SCP, 1994).
Finally, one may argue whether giving subsidies on a large scale, as current policy practice
shows, is really an optimal policy. Clearly, some arguments justify education positive education
subsidies, see also the box. However, not all arguments are equally valid. Probably the most
important reason for education subsidies is the failing of capital and insurance markets. These
market failures are the roots of inequality of opportunity. I.e., not all students can obtain an
education at the same nancial conditions. Failing capital and insurance markets hamper access
for students from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Disadvantaged students suffer more from
liquidity constraints because they cannot nance education themselves. And, because they are
less wealthy, require larger returns on their investments in human capital because they are
typically more risk averse. Both capital and insurance market failures result in under-investment
in human capital from a social perspective.
However, education subsidies do not tackle the real problems with capital and insurance
market imperfections. In principle, an equity participation model where the government buys
shares in graduates' human capital in exchange for funds (to cover costs of living and tuition)
while enrolled in education is sufcient to overcome credit and insurance market failures.
Students obtain funds independently from background conditions so that liquidity constraints
are avoided. Income insurance by means of pooling income risks solves the under-investment
problem due to risk aversion. An equity participation scheme does therefore not require external
subsidies, see also Jacobs and Van Wijnbergen (2002).
An equity participation scheme has two potential disadvantages, however. First, the insurance
of income risks may cause problems with adverse selection and moral hazard. This is the case if
the system attracts too many high risk - low return graduates and the low risk high return
graduates do not want to participate. One may then opt for a debt-remittance scheme whereby
the government shares in the income risks as suggested by Kane (1997). This is the case in
Australia. Then, education subsidies enter in ex post fashion (after graduation), but the incidence
is much more equal than ex ante subsidies (while studying) because only the graduates with very
low life-time incomes receive income protection rather than all graduates. Second, the equity
participation model potentially distorts education choices and labour supply decisions because
income insurance and redistribution of incomes cannot be completely separated. One could also
say that redistribution causes a moral hazard problem because it reduces labour supply and
distorts education choices. In order to mitigate the adverse consequences of redistribution of
incomes, the government may again limit the repayment burden on graduates, e.g. through an
8Economic reasons to subsidise education
 Positive externalities. Education fosters the production and dissemination of knowledge and technology which in
turn contributes to economic growth. Due to non-rivalness and non-excludability of knowledge under-investment
in human capital may result, see e.g. Nelsson and Phelps (1966), Lucas (1988), and Romer (1990). Education
should then be subsidised education to restore social efciency. Education may alsocause negativeexternalities. If
education is asignalling device onlyreecting differences in abilities, taking up education as such is not productive
(Arrow,1971; Spence,1973; and Stiglitz, 1975). Further, Murphy et al. (1991) suggest that particular types of
education may result in rent-seeking activities (e.g. lawyers), which harms economic efciency and cause negative
externalities. These arguments weaken the case for subsidising education. Empirical support for the presence of
positive education externalities cannot be found, see also Heckman and Klenow (1997), Acemoglu and Angrist
(2000), Heckman (2000), Ciccone and Peri (2002), Krueger and Lindahl (2002), among others. Education
subsidies are therefore difcult to justify on the basis of perceived externalities.
 Subsidies to correct tax distortions. (Progressive) taxation comes along with distortions on learning decisions. It
is generally optimal to restore incentives to learn by means of education subsidies that eliminate the tax-wedge
on learning, see also Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001) and Van Ewijk and Tang (2000a). If, however, some returns of
education are non-taxed (immaterial returns) the case for subsidising education on the basis of scal distortions
is diminished. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001) and Jacobs and De Mooij (2001) show that - even in the absence of
consumption motives - current education subsidies are likely to be much higher than necessary to eliminate the
distortions from the tax system on learning decisions.
 Merit goods. Some types of education may contribute to immaterial aspects of welfare, such as culture,
citizenship, etc. There will be under-investment because society may value these subjects while private agents
are not willing to pay for it. The government may want to compensate private agents for low monetary returns of
education types that are socially desirable. The public good value of education is not measurable, however, and
is based on political judgements on the public value of education.
 Myopia. Some argue that students are irrational and not able to make the right decision to enrol in higher
education while it is actually worthwhile to do so. Education subsidies may yield proper incentives to irrational
students. But this seems to be a second-best instrument. First-best would be to provide students with better
information so that the decision making process is based on right premises, rather than correcting the mistakes
in decisions through subsidies. Furthermore, one can cast doubt on the irrationality of graduates. Webbink and
Hartog (2000) nd that students can predict their future salaries very well. If this is so, why would students be
irrational and not choose to enrol in education?
 Income redistribution. Subsidies on higher education stimulate the supply of skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers. This compresses wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers, because skilled workers
become less scarce relative to unskilled workers. A government that wants to redistribute incomes may want
to subsidise education, see Tinbergen (1975) and Teulings (2000). However, the benets of more equality need
to be balanced against the unequal incidence of education expenditures. Dur and Teulings (2001) calculate
that the unequal incidence of education subsidies roughly cancels out against the effects on relative wages
through general equilibrium repercussions. Therefore, it is doubtful whether education subsidies can be used
for redistributional purposes.
9 Capital markets imperfections. Imperfections originate from the fact that human capital cannot serve as collateral
due to its illiquid nature (non-slavery), see also Friedman (1962). Moreover, information asymmetries (moral
hazard and adverse selection) between borrower and bank results in credit rationing, see Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). Capital market imperfections may give under-investment in human capital. (Income dependent) grants
are can be used to alleviate problems with imperfect capital markets. Empirical evidence on the importance
of capital market imperfections is mixed. For example Shea (2000) and and Plug and Vijverberg (2001) nd
empirical evidence for the importance of capital market imperfections, at least for the poor. Cameron and Taber
(2000), on the other hand, suggest that capital market imperfections are not important at all.
 Uninsurable risks. If risks of investments in human capital cannot be insured, risk averse students require
a risk premium on their investments and there is under-investment in human capital, see Levhari and Weiss
(1974). The insurance market fails because trade in claims on human capital is legally impossible (non-slavery).
Under-investment only results if income risks are not correlated. In that case there are private risks, but no social
risks and the risks can be pooled. Some risks of education, such as employment conditions and technological
changes, cannot be pooled because these risks cannot be diversied at the national level. Also here, information
problems associated with insurance arise (moral hazard and adverse selection). Rothshield and Stiglitz (1976)
show that insurance markets may not even exist if there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the
insured. Subsidies on education may restore disincentives to accumulate human capital if it is impossible to
insure income risks. Judd (2000) argues that there is a 'human capital premium puzzle' because the returns on
human capital are way above the real risk free rate on government bonds and similar to real returns on equity.
This suggests that there may be social under-investment due to the riskiness of human capital.
opting out provision, see also Nerlove (1972).
A subsidy is a second-best means to resolve the capital market imperfection. Giving grants that
are independent of nancial needs, is not an efcient policy. Students without funding problems,
because they have sufciently high (parental) incomes, or can obtain nance themselves in the
capital market, also receive education subsidies, see Oosterbeek (1998). More targeted education
subsidies may partially resolve this issue. But, this is not free either. Income dependent grants
distort incentives for parents to save for their children's education, see Edlin (1993) and Feldstein
(1995). Further, subsidies may result in enrolment of too many `marginal students', i.e., students
with insufcient academic abilities.
Education subsidies are also a second-best means to resolve the insurance market imperfection.
Subsidies are an highly ineffective instrument to combat risk aversion, because subsidies do not
reduce the spread in future earnings. Subsidies should therefore be very large in order to induce
risk averse graduates (with sufciently high returns) to enrol in education, see also Jacobs and
Van Wijnbergen (2002). Second, also the graduates that do not need income protection (because
they have sufciently safe incomes) receive education subsidies.
Furthermore, since in principle no additional subsidies are needed for an equity participation
scheme, some other general advantages of an equity participation scheme over subsidies exist.
First, subsidies cause welfare losses because the government has to rely on distortionary taxation
10to nance subsidies. Second, education subsidies redistribute incomes from poor to rich.
Many authors have advocated education nance based on loans with insurance elements like
an ICL system or an equity participation scheme such as a GT, see e.g. Friedman (1962), Nerlove
(1972, 1975), Barr (1991, 1993), Chapman (1997), Oosterbeek (1994, 1998) and Van Wijnbergen
(1998). The advantages compared to education subsidies are summarised as follows:
 Students receive funds on the basis of their needs without distorting savings decisions of parents;
 Student are confronted more with the real costs of education so that `marginal students' do not
enrol;
 Government resources are allocated more efciently because resources are not transferred to
students that have no funding problems or do not encounter problems in repaying their debts;
 Deadweight losses of nancing education subsidies are avoided;
 Redistribution of incomes in the wrong direction is avoided. All redistributions go from either
the lucky graduates or the average tax payer to unlucky graduates;
 Equality of opportunity is warranted since everyone can obtain funds to nance education at the
same conditions independently from background conditions;
 Risk aversion is largely avoided because graduates do not need to repay anything when they are
not able to do so.
As we noted before there are two disadvantages of ICL and GT's to be taken into account:
 Asymmetric information between students and the government may cause problems with moral
hazard and adverse selection.
 Any pooling system of income risks also entails redistribution which implies that there are
potential efciency losses since labour supply of graduates and education choices are distorted.
We analyse the nancial consequences of a switch to an GT/ICL system that (partially) replaces
education subsidies. We derive the repayment conditions for individual students, the
distributional consequences and the effects on public expenditures. The general motivation is
that education subsidies are inefcient in resolving capital and insurance market imperfections
and that the nancing system of higher education can be more efcient. I.e., whatever the level
of education subsidies, accessibility of education can be warranted at lower public costs. Clearly,
there is also an equity gain if the regime switch is accompanied by an increase in private
contributions or if ex ante subsidies are replaced by ex post subsidies. We take into account the
disadvantages on labour supply behaviour. We can only qualitatively analyse the role of moral
hazard and adverse selection effects. Lacking empirical evidence on these matters impedes a
thorough quantitative assessment.
At the outset we remark that this analysis does not discuss differentiation of educational
costs. I.e., we do not allow for differentiation in repayment conditions according to eld of study.
There can be advantages of tuition fee differentiation, however, see Nerlove (1972) and CPB
11(2002) for a more elaborate discussion on these matters.
We compute the repayment conditions and the insurance aspects of these nancing schemes.
To that end we estimate the life-time earning capacity of graduates. Only by knowing the earning
capacity of graduates we can assess to what extent graduates are able to bear some of the costs of
higher education. Additionally, we construct risk classes in incomes so as to incorporate the
uncertainties of future wages. These risk classes are derived from estimated standard deviations
of the wage proles. This allows us to assess the insurance aspects of the proposed education
nance regimes.
This paper is related to some studies that attempt to quantify the consequences of increases
in private contributions to higher education. First, there is a policy report by Rinnooy Kan,
Moerland and Kapteyn (1988) (RMK). The purpose of that policy analysis was to investigate the
consequences of replacing the (income dependent) grants by annuity type of loans provided by
banks in the private sector. In this proposal, banks are compensated for the costs of default, the
so called social risk, in order to make such a policy shift attractive to the private sector. The main
focus of this analysis was to estimate the amount of compensation that private banks would
receive. They found that the fraction of debt that would not be repaid was about 6%. This policy
proposal was never implemented. Strange enough, this well documented study disappeared
from policy discussions on education nance reform.
Although we follow largely the same lines as RMK, our analysis differs in some important
aspects. First of all, we analyse the consequences of raising private contributions that are possibly
much larger than studied by RMK. This has important consequences for the risks of default, and
thereby on repayment conditions. Second, RMK only analyse increases in private contributions
with the annuity type of loan system that we currently have and do not consider ICL's or GT's.
They do investigate the option however to increase the repayment period to 25 years, and they
nd that the fraction of debt that is not repaid falls about 50%. Further, they raise the option to
include a solidarity premium on interest rates for loans so as to increase the insurance
characteristics of the loan system. We investigate the consequences of such a solidarity premium.
Second, Barr and Falkingham (1994) analyse the consequences of an ICL/GT system in the
UK on the basis of a numerical model (LIFEMOD) with heterogeneous agents. Their main
contribution is to show the various ways how increases in private contributions can be achieved.
They nd that an ICL/GT system protects individuals from high repayment burdens and about
90% of total borrowing is repaid under an ICL compared with 80% under a mortgage type of
loan scheme. The drawback of their analysis is that they only consider loans of limited size (1000
UK pounds). Consequently, we do not gain insight in the tax burdens that individuals face if they
paid full (or partly subsidised) tuition. Repayment behaviour changes when larger loans are
needed to nance education.
Third, experiences with the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS)
provide information on the consequences of increasing private contributions. Chapman (1997),
12and CPB (2001a) extensively discuss the effects of HECS. In HECS graduates pay around 23% of
the direct costs of education. Students have to option to pay (differentiated) tuition fees up-front
or to defer fees. In the latter case graduates repay a (increasing) fraction of their incomes while
working. The government, i.e., the average tax payer bears the costs of default. The introduction
of HECS had no important effects upon enrolment even for students with disadvantaged
backgrounds. Furthermore, almost all outstanding debts were repaid, so that costs of default
were minor.
The setup of this paper is as follows. We start with a discussion of ICL and GT schemes of
education nance in sections 2 and 3. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the derivation of the
present value of the earnings of graduates and to the costs of education, respectively. In section 6
we describe our measures for income uncertainty. In section 7 we discuss some consequences of
an GT/ICL for redistribution and its associated dead weight losses. In sections 8, 9, and 10 we
discuss the consequences of introducing a pure loan system, a GT and an ICL system,
respectively. In section 11 we discuss some economic aspects of ICL's or GT's. In section 12 we
conclude. An appendix at the end contains a description of the data used in the paper and the
empirical analysis underlying the simulation model.
132 Dening graduate taxes and income contingent loans
To start our discussion we introduce some background denitions. There seems to be a lot of
confusion on what an ICL system really is, and the same holds for a GT system. To avoid this
confusion we precisely dene what is and what is not an ICL or GT system. As becomes clear
later on, the GT can be seen as a special case of an ICL system. There are two essential elements
in both systems, as explained in the introduction: the loan or equity element and the insurance
element to insure income risks.
The basic idea of an ICL is that students borrow the funds from the government to cover the
costs of tuition and (partly) the costs of living while enrolled in education. Costs education are
deferred to the stage in life where graduates start to earn income. When graduates start to work
they repay a (potentially differentiated) fraction of earned incomes to cover the costs of their loan
including interest. This repayment rate may differ according to the length of the study, costs of
the study, et cetera.
For a proper working of any GT or ICL the repayment rate should be differentiated according
to length of enrolment. Clearly, also students that do not graduate earn a positive return on the
years enrolled in education, see also Groot and Oosterbeek (1994).1 Making repayment
obligations dependent on whether graduates receive their diploma or not will for sure give
problems with moral hazard. E.g. students may actually do the entire curriculum needed to
graduate, but never collect their diplomas. In our analysis, we do not consider differentiation of
repayment rates according to enrolment duration, because all graduates are assumed to be
enrolled for the same time. The costs of drop-outs are taken into account in indirect fashion
because graduates are assumed to be enrolled for a longer time than the nominal duration of
their education.
Some of the graduates may not repay the complete principal and interest, so that default
occurs. The crucial difference with an ordinary loan is that the risks of non-repayment are
bounded for student. This is the insurance element. There are in general two ways of protecting
students against default: risk pooling among students and risk shifting to society.
First, risk pooling is an insurance system, where risks of default are shared among graduates.
The interest rate on the loans contains a premium to cover the costs of `default' of those who are
not able to repay. Therefore, students who succeed in repaying their loan are paying the costs of
nonrepayment of those who fail. Consequently, there is redistribution from the lucky students to
the unlucky students after graduation. Individuals who cannot repay their loan because they have
insufcient incomes are not obliged to repay the loan. Second, under risk shifting, the default
risks are borne by society as a whole as in the Australian HECS system. In that case there is in
principle no redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky students, except for the fact that the
1 Groot andOosterbeek (1994) interpret thepositive returns to education of drop-outs asevidence againstthescreen-
ing hypothesis.
14lucky students contribute via their tax payments to the government budget from which the costs
of default are funded. Note that now tax nanced education subsidies are still entering the
education system, but in an ex post fashion. These subsidies are not given when students are
studying (ex ante), but only after graduation when they are not able to repay their debts.
Under a GT system every graduate receives an amount of resources, equity. Graduates retain
a (potentially differentiated) fraction of their incomes and pay a fraction of their life-time
incomes to the government as dividends: the graduate tax. Repayments under a GT may (far)
exceed initial funds (including interest). Therefore, contributions by graduates with high
incomes under a GT system are relatively larger than under an ICL scheme and there is more
insurance and redistribution. From the individual perspective, there is therefore no link between
the amount of equity received and the total repayments. This is not the case with an ICL system.
In our opinion, the crucial difference between a GT and an ICL system is related to the
amount of insurance and/or income protection. The GT offers relatively more insurance (or
redistribution) than the ICL. In an ICL system, the graduates with high enough incomes stop
their repayments when they have repaid their debts including interest and default premiums.
This is not so under a graduate tax.
A semantic confusion may also arise to what extent an ICL or GT may be called equity
participation models. Friedman and Kuznetz (1945) were the rst to express the problem of
nancing education with explicit reference to equity:
Investment in professional training will not necessarily be pushed to the margin because
earning power is seldom explicitly treated as an asset to be capitalized and sold to others
by the issuance of stock. [...] if individuals sold stock in themselves, i.e., obligated
themselves to pay a xed proportion of future earnings, investors could diversify their
holdings and balance capital appreciations against capital losses. Friedman and Kuznets
(1945, p.90).2
With an equity contract there is no limit on the dividends that graduates pay out to the
government similar to stocks. Since there is an upward limit on contributions to an ICL system,
as with ordinary loan contracts, only systems of a graduate tax can be called equity participation
models. However, an ICL is not exactly like an ordinary loan, because it also has equity elements
when income risks are pooled, solidarity premiums are included and default risks are not shifted
to society. One can say that an ICL is a hybrid contract: a combination of an ordinary debt
2 Later Friedman restated this in similar words:
[...] The device to meet the corresponding problem for other risky investments is equity investment plus
limited liability on the part of shareholders. The counterpart for education would be to buy a share in an
individual's earning prospects; to advance him the funds needed to nance his training on condition that he
agree to pay the lender a specied fraction of his future earnings. In this way, a lender would get back more
than his initial investment from relatively successful individuals, which would compensate for the failure to
recoup his original investment from the unsuccessful. Friedman (1962, p.103).
15contract and an equity contract. Consequently, the Australian HECS is, strictly speaking, not an
equity participation model, rst of all because default risks are borne by society rather than
shared amongst graduates. Second, repayment obligations in HECS are limited and there is no
insurance/solidarity aspect involved.
Confusion may also arise about other characteristics of the education nance regimes. First,
throughout we only consider so called fully funded schemes of education nance. That is, we
assume that the education nance scheme does not imply income redistribution between
age-cohorts. The government provides funds to students by issuing government debt. With the
repayments of the graduates the government repays it's debt in full. This is analogue to a fully
funded pension system. Occasionally, proponents of a graduate system have suggested a
`pay-as-you-work' system where the currently working graduates nance costs of the currently
studying. In our opinion this intergenerational link is not essential for a GT system. However,
this way of nancing education generally implies income redistribution from the older to the
younger generations if the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate of students enrolling
in higher education. Only in case the real interest rate is equal to the growth rate of enrolment in
education, this system is intergenerationally neutral. We do not see convincing arguments to
incorporate elements of obligatory intergenerational redistribution in the system of education
nance.
Second, most proposals of an ICL system seem to be based on voluntary participation by
students, whereas most proposals of GT's seem to be based on obligatory participation. However,
one can easily implement voluntary GT's and obligatory ICL's, so this is not a vital difference. We
shall initially assume that participation in both an ICL system and the GT system is voluntary.
Later we discuss the economic motivations (notably adverse selection) to make the system of
education nance obligatory.
Third, the size of the loan or the amount of equity, may be chosen by graduates themselves or
may be determined by the government. In our analysis we initially assume that the size of the
amount of resources available to graduates is set by the government for every student at the
current levels of support for students, i.e., the level that is determined by the size of the basic
grant, the average level of the income dependent grant, travelling subsidies (OV-kaart) and the
institutional costs of education. However, we also present some analyses where the size of funds
made available to students is increased or decreased. Later we also discuss the economic reasons
for restricting the amount of funds made available to students.
163 A mathematical model
In order to clarify the important mechanisms at work we now set up a model of education
nance that serves as the basis of the analysis in this paper. This allows us to highlight the
consequences of the nancing regimes.
3.1 Income contingent loans
Let the principal for graduate n of the loan in an ICL be denoted Dn (in thousands of euro).
Students repay a constant fraction of income when working. In this study, we take into account
that medical and technical studies have longer duration, so that Dn is larger for those who have
longer education tracks. We also differentiate between higher vocational and university
education. However, within each education type we assume that Dn is equal for all graduates.
This assumption corresponds to the at tuition fees that we currently have in higher education in
the Netherlands. For the theoretical exposition, we assume that D is equal for all graduates.1
In an ICL, the principal including interest is repaid in income contingent fashion. When
working, graduates pay a constant fraction t of their income w, for the repayment of interest and
principal. A at repayment rate implies that repayments of all graduates are treated the same
whatever the type of education they pursued. The important difference between the two is that
potentially not only cross-subsidies are introduced between graduates of different subjects (as
with at tuition fees), but also cross subsidies from high to low return studies if interest rates
contain a default/solidarity premium.
The repayment RT in year T equals twT.2 Repayments start in year t and continue to year T.





exceeds a level of 1+ d times the value of the loan, repayments are stopped. This is the opting out
provision that limits the amount of insurance and redistributions which may be introduced to
avoid moral hazard or adverse selection effects, see also Nerlove (1972). An opting out provision
implies that there is a maximum on the contributions by graduates.
Hence, in mathematical terms the repayment scheme can be expressed as follows:
RT = twT; tWT < (1+d)D
RT = 0; tWT  (1+d)D: (3.1)
1 There are clear economic arguments to differentiate tuition costs, and therefore the repayment rates, between the
various subjects, see for example Nerlove (1972). Egalitarian motives seem to be at the heart of the arguments
against differentiation of tuition costs. We do not want to get involved here in a discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of differentiation of tuition costs.
2 The repayment rate t may depend on actual income earned t = t(w). If repayment rate increases with income we
have that dt=dw > 0. This is the case in the Australian system. In the remainder we assume that the repayment rate
is at.
17These equations state formally that the graduate makes a repayment as long as the present value
of repayments is below the present value of debts including the opting out parameter d. One
could also allow for a lower bound on income below which graduates do not have repay anything.
We abstract from the possibility that graduates repay their debt quicker than necessary.
We can say that d is a measure for the default or insurance premium for the certainty that
students do not have to repay debts when they cannot do so because their incomes are too low.























(1+r+r)a t  D; (3.2)
where r is the so called default premium on loans. The default premium on top of the interest
rate makes the effective interest rate higher, so that it takes longer to repay the loan. The
graduates who do repay fully, pay more than loan plus interest, so that costs of default can be
covered. Consequently, including a default premium in an ICL is economically the inverse of an
opting-out provision. The lower is d the quicker high income earning graduates leave the system
and the less insurance/redistribution takes place so that r is effectively lower.
As mentioned already in the introduction, income redistribution and insurance of default
risks cannot be separated. The reason is that ex ante insurance requires ex post redistribution of
incomes from lucky to unlucky graduates. This inevitably also causes redistribution from high
ability graduates to low ability graduates, but also redistribution from graduates that pursued
high earning types of education (e.g. law and economics) to graduates that have chosen low
earning subjects (e.g. arts, languages).
r can also be interpreted as a `solidarity' premium. Apart from the risks of default that are
covered by r, there is also income redistribution. Rinnooy Kan et al. (1988) suggest to investigate
the consequences of such a solidarity premium on loans by students. This can be done by
analyzing the effects of increases in r for repayment rates, social risks and so on.
In the numerical calculations later on we use this last representation of the repayment
scheme with a default premium r, since r has a more intuitive economic interpretation than d.
For the theoretical exposition, however, the formulation in terms of d is more easy. We note that
there is a strictly positive relation between d and r
As a theoretical benchmark we can construct a pure loan system if d = 0 (r = 0) and if the
repayment rate tn can be varied for each student the system. Then only the principal (including
interest) is repaid. This is an articial construct, however, since in reality repayment rates t
cannot be made contingent on individual incomes. This construct allows us to estimate the
repayment burden (as a fraction of life-time incomes) on graduates when private contributions
3 Note that differences in repayments in these systems emerge because the timing matters.
18are increased and have to be self nanced. The insurance element is completely absent because
there is no redistribution from the graduates that succeed to repay their loan, to the graduates
who do not succeed to do so. Nor is there an aggregate loss of default if the government can vary
the repayment schedule, i.e., the tax rate, for each student, provided that life-time earnings are
always higher than outstanding loans.
The notable difference with the annuity-type of loan system, which we currently have in the
Netherlands, is that the repayment schedule is different. In the annuity system repayments are a
constant amount during a xed period of time (15 years). In our repayment schedule the
repayments are a constant fraction of income (t) during a xed period of time.
We have an ICL system with full risk-shifting if d = 0 (r = 0) and the repayment rate t is set at
some arbitrary level and is equal for all students. Then, only the principal (including interest) is
repaid. If the students cannot repay the costs of their education the system makes a loss that is
borne by society. Suppose that we have N students and they borrow amounts D, but differ in
their wage incomes wn
a. The students that are not able to repay their loan in full are indexed 1::: ¯ N.





















Wn  ¯ ND; (3.3)





(1+r)a t is the discounted value of life-time earnings of graduate n. The rst
term in the rst line measures the total costs of default for those who are not able to repay in full.
The second term gives the contributions for the graduates who do repay in full. This term is
equal to zero.
For given repayment rate t and earnings Wn, savings on government expenditures diminish
if private contributions are increased. On the one hand increasing private contributions increases
the average level of debts D since students are confronted more with the costs. However, this also
implies that the loss of the system L increases since more students are not able to repay their
debts in full, i.e., ¯ N increases.4 (The rst term in in the rst line becomes larger). Although there
is always a gain by raising private contributions, this gain is lowered at higher levels of private
funding because lowering ex ante subsidies (higher D) increases ex post subsidies (lower L) on
education.
Replacing ex ante subsidies with ex post subsidies makes the resulting distribution of
incomes more equal. Ex ante subsidies are given to all students, whether they have high incomes
or not during their working lives. However, only graduates who are not able to repay their debts
see their debt remitted so only the `poor' graduates benet from ex post subsidies.
If d (r) is in an intermediate range, d > 0 (r > 0), we speak of an ICL system with (partial) risk
pooling. Repayments for graduates who have paid 1+d times the value of debt during their
4 We assume that there are no positive or adverse selection effects that changes the number of students N:
19working lives are stopped. If, after the repayment period some graduates have not repaid 1+d
times their debt, the outstanding debt is remitted. As those who succeed to repay their loan, pay
more than principal plus interest, funds are raised so as to cover for the costs of those graduates
whose outstanding debts are remitted.
For a full risk pooling system, both the opting out parameter d (r) and the tax rate t must
simultaneously keep the books of the ICL system balanced. This is the case if total repayments of
those who are able to repay debts, plus the repayments of those who eventually fail, equal the





Wn = ND: (3.4)
In order to illustrate the relation between the opting out parameter and the tax-rate we










The repayment rate is lower if there are more graduates repaying their debts, i.e., when N= ¯ N is
higher. The repayment rate is higher if the average incomes of the defaulters decrease, i.e., when
the denominator is lower. The effect of a increase in the opting out parameter d is that the
graduates pay relatively more of their incomes to repay their debt. Therefore, the tax rate must
decrease. However, a decrease in d has the additional composition effect that there are more
costs of default because the number of defaulters also decreases for given N. Repayment
obligations are more strict. Therefore, the repayment rate increases because of this composition
effect. Finally, the average incomes of the remaining defaulters are higher, if more agents default,
so that the repayment rate must decrease on that account.
A combination of risk pooling and risk shifting occurs where d > 0 (r > 0) and the tax rate
parameter t are set such that the books of the system do not balance and part of the default
losses are borne by society. In that case the total loss is given by:





where the rst term is the present value of outstanding debts, the second term gives the
repayments of those who do not default, and the last term denotes the repayments of those who
cannot repay in full. Similarly to the system with full risk-shifting, in a system with partial
risk-shifting raising private contributions will only yield savings on government outlays at
diminishing rate because reducing ex ante subsidies (higher D) increase ex post subsidies (lower
L). Notwithstanding that ex post subsidies are more equitable since these are only given to
graduates with low incomes.
203.2 Graduate taxes
Similarly as in an ICL, let the amount of equity be denoted D (in thousands of euro). Students
repay a constant fraction of income when working. In an GT, graduates pay a constant fraction t
of their income w. The government may balance the books of the graduate tax by choosing t so
that no costs of default occur. The repayment scheme is now somewhat simpler than an ICL, i.e.,
RT in year T equals twT for all T. Repayments are never stopped. Hence, in mathematical terms
the repayment scheme can be expressed as follows:
RT = twT: (3.7)
Clearly, exactly a graduate tax repayment scheme results if we let d (r) go to innity in the
ICL scheme. In that case, graduates have to repay a fraction of their incomes during their whole
lives because they never reach the threshold when the repayments are stopped. Therefore, the
graduate tax is a special case of the income contingent loan system where the solidarity premium
is very high. A graduate tax entails more insurance/redistribution than an income contingent
loan where the default/solidarity premium is bounded.
In case of a GT with full risk pooling, the tax rate in a graduate tax system t is determined
simply so as to equate the total repayments to the total costs of government debts that were
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From the last equation follows that the larger is the average value of life time income of a
graduate - the denominator -, the lower is the graduate tax needed to balance the books.
If t is not set so as to balance the books of the system, there is always a combination of risk
pooling and risk shifting, i.e., a GT with (partial) risk shifting. Similarly as before, we derive that






For given repayment rate and life-time earnings, increasing private contributions yield
diminishing savings on government expenditures, because they increase the total loss of the
graduate tax system if D gets higher.
214 Earning capacities of graduates
To analyse various policy options to raise individual contributions to higher education, we need to
determine the earning capacity of graduated students. The reason for doing so is that we want to
compute tax and repayment rates for various nancing models. Therefore, we need to relate the
costs of education to the life-time incomes of graduates later on. We measure earning capacity by
the present value of life-time labour earnings (PV). Only by knowing how much students earn
after graduation we can assess the consequences of various systems of education nance.
We base our calculations of life-time earnings on empirically estimated earnings proles of
graduates. We estimated standard OLS regressions of 4-th order polynomial age-earnings
proles with xed effects for every education type, separately for men, women, higher vocational,
and university training. Based on our estimated coefcients we are able to simulate an age
earnings prole for a male or female worker with a particular type and subject of education. We
use the estimated coefcients to predict the yearly incomes of graduates as follows:









where a hat denotes an estimate.  aj is the estimated xed effect for education type j and  bz is the
estimated coefcient for the z-th power of experience. As such, we obtain predicted wages for an
individual with experience e. We then transformed the predicted wages at experience e to
predicted wages at age a using the relations between experience and age.1
In gures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 we plot the estimated wage proles for the various education
categories. Estimated coefcients are such that the familiar age-earnings proles follow. Proles
are consistent with the literature, see e.g. Becker (1993), Murphy and Welch (1992). I.e., proles
are roughly concave: earnings increase over time at decreasing rates. Details of the estimations
and the data that are used can be found in the appendix at the end.
There are differences between the different types of education, between men and women,
and between higher vocational and university education. First, between the various types of
education we can see a pattern. From the constants in our estimations follows that economics
law and technical education types have higher earnings for both men and women. Then follow
the other subjects with cultural and languages and arts studies at the bottom. Second, the
differences between men and women are quite striking. Men have systematically steeper
earnings proles. Women experience that their wage increases level off earlier over the life-cycle.
Third, the shapes of the wage proles differ importantly between higher vocational and
university training, because the latter are much steeper. Average wages are therefore lower for
higher vocational compared to university education.
1 E.g. a = e+22 if graduates have higher vocational education. Similar transformations apply to university educated
graduates: a =e+24 for b-types of education, a =e+25 for medical types of education and a=e+23 for other types
of education.
22Figure 4.1 Wage proles women higher vocational studies
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Figure 4.2 Wage proles men higher vocational studies
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23Figure 4.3 Wage proles women university studies
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Figure 4.4 Wage proles men university studies
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24So far we assumed that graduates worked full-time over the entire life-cycle. In reality this is not
the case. We therefore have to correct the estimated life-time earnings for these labour supply
effects. Since some graduates do not work full-time or do not participate, their present value of
life-time earnings falls.
We adjust the PV of earnings evaluated at age a for labour supply effects by simply correcting
earnings in each year with a factor Li;s; j;a in year a. We dene this correction factor as follows:
Li;s; j;a  Li;s; jLi;s;apri;s;aIpra: (4.2)
If a graduate participates in the labour market, Li;s; j denotes an index of labour supply of a worker
with education level i, gender s and education type j. If Li;s;j = 1 people work full-time. Similarly,
Li;s;a denotes an index of labour supply of a worker with education level i of gender s as of age a.2
Not all graduates participate in the labour market however. We correct for this by multiplying
with pri;s;a which denotes the participation rate in the labour force (lies between 0 and 1) of a
worker with education type i, which is only disaggregated in higher vocational and university
education as of age a. Ipra is the index of labour force participation as of age a. We use this index
(1997 = 1) to correct for projected growth in participation rates in the next 20 years. The last
index is also only dependent on age and not differentiated between the various types and levels of
education. Tables of the data that were used and more details can be found in the appendix.3
We make two important assumptions with respect to the index of labour force participation.
First, if agents are younger than 25 years old, we assume that the index takes the value of a 26
year old agent. The reason is that in our numerical calculations later on we assume that higher
vocational graduates enter the labour force at age 22, and university graduates at 23 years of age.
Applying ofcial statistics at these ages is inappropriate since statistics on labour force
participation rates suggest very low participation rates at these ages, but this is exactly because
many young people are still in college, i.e., not all graduates leave higher education at 22 or 23
years of age.
The second assumption is that the participation index remains constant after age 55 at the
level of age 55. Clearly, by all measures labour force attachment of the older workers falls sharply
after 55 years of age. This does not imply that incomes of these workers incomes decrease in the
same way as their labour supply and participation rates. The reason is that older workers
participate in retire early schemes, disability benets, take up their pensions, etc. Incomes
remain therefore fairly high - presumably at levels comparable to a worker of 55 years old. We
assume that incomes until the age of 65 are in principle subject to the GT or that repayment
2 We can only use the averages over each group (age/or education type) because of data restrictions. This procedure
is valid if life-cycle effects in hours worked are independent from the education type j.
3 In a previous version of this paper we also corrected for mortality, but this correction did not affect any of our results
because mortality rates are simply too low to have any signicant effects.
25obligations under an ICL system continue even when some kind of social benet is collected.4
We further assume that participation decisions do not affect the slopes of the age-earnings
proles. This is correct if age-earnings proles are not affected by labour supply decisions.
However, these proles are expected to differ as a consequence labour supply decisions. The
earnings proles have been `corrected' for life-cycle labour supply effects as a result of the
experience terms (age). The proles are not corrected for differences in hourly labour supply and
participation rates. We cannot easily correct the wage proles for labour supply and participation
decisions because labour supply and participation rates are endogenous regressors in an
estimation with the wage as dependent variable. In general it is only possible to correct for this
by estimating of a more structural model where this endogeneity is taken into account. This is
beyond the scope of this research.
A number of assumptions must be made before turning to the calculations of the PV of
life-time earnings. Given the fact that our estimates are based on a cross-section of wages we
have to be careful in transforming the cross-sectional proles into time-series proles. The most
important reason why cross-sections differ from time-series is the fact that there is wage growth
due to technological progress (amongst other things), see also Becker (1993).5 There is a stable
increase in real wages over time of about 2% per annum. A calculation of the PV solely based on
the cross-sectional estimates neglects this exogenous wage growth and will therefore under
estimate the true PV.
In the remainder we present calculations based on various assumptions on the growth of
wages. For the base calculations we use a rate of growth g = :02. This is approximately the real
long-run wage growth.6 Skill biased technological progress, for example due to the
ICT-revolution, may further increase real wage growth for higher educated workers so that
higher wage growth is a possibility to investigate. We consider cases of g = :01 and g = :03 as
robustness checks.
A similar problem arises concerning the real discount factor that is used in the PV
calculations. As is well known, the discount factor inuences the outcomes to considerable
extent. One may use a real risk free discount rate of r = :04 according to the ofcial guidelines
for government investments in the Netherlands. However, the real long-run return on
government bonds in the 20th century is about 2-3% per year, see also table 4.1. In recent years,
4 In principle, also pension incomes may be subject to the GT/ICL schemes, because pension incomes are dependent
on earned labour incomes.
5 Becker (1993) also mentions business cycles, trends in supply of educated workers, and occupation or life-cycle
employment changes (p.231).
6 Annual wage growth in the post-war years was 3%, but this caused a steady increase in the labour income share.
We do not expect that wage growth will increase at this pace. Statistics Netherlands (1998) gives a gross hourly wage
rate for the private sector equal to 0.5 euro in 1950 and 10.0 euro in 1993. The consumer price indices in these years
were 19 and 109 respectively (base year = 1990).
26real returns have increased way beyond the centuries' average to about 4% or more, depending
on the various sources. The question is whether a real interest rate equal to 4% is appropriate in
light of the relatively low long-run real return on government bonds. For our base-line
calculations we use a value equal to r = :03. However, we also present robustness checks for
lower and higher real discount rates.
Table 4.1 Real returns on government bonds
Fase, 1997 (1952-1973) .000
Fase, 1997 (1974-1995) .033
Fase, 1997 (1952-1995) .016
Eicholtz et al., 2000 (1960-1980) -.017
Eicholtz et al., 2000 (1980-2000) .059
Eicholtz et al., 2000 (1900-2000) .013
Van Ewijk et al., 2002 (1900-2000) .033
Van Ewijk et al., 2002 (1951-2000) .026
Van Ewijk et al., 2002 (1981-2000) .048
Furthermore, we possibly need to apply a risk-premium on top of the risk-free discount rate. The
reason is that the government buys `shares' in graduates' human capital. Since the returns on
these shares are not risk-free due to macroeconomic shocks, the average tax-payer is confronted
with uncertainty in revenues from the education nancing system. In principle this uncertainty
government revenues needs to be valued, see also Van Ewijk and Tang (2000b). If all individual
income risks can be diversied (pooled) at the national level, there is no macroeconomic
uncertainty so that the required risk-premium is zero. However, the presence of macroeconomic
shocks that cannot be diversied at the national level requires a positive risk-premium. We
present robustness calculations with a positive risk-premium.
On the other hand one may argue that there is a negative covariance between tax revenues (or
government expenditures) and education. I.e., the variability in tax revenues or government
expenditures is reduced when people become more educated, see also Gould et al. (2000). The
reason is that higher educated are typically less dependent on social benets, have shorter spells
of unemployment, and so on. This implies that a shift in tax revenues from low-skilled workers,
towards investments in high skilled workers reduces the average risk of total tax revenues.
Therefore, one may question the appropriateness of using a risk-premium in our calculations to
value the uncertainties associated with the revenues from the nancing scheme.
For our base-case scenario we do not use a risk-premium on the real interest rate. I.e., we
assume that the two effects described above cancel out (i.e., systematic risks due to
macroeconomic shocks and less variation in tax revenues or government expenditures). We also
present calculations for the case in which we apply risk premia of p = :01 and p = :02. An
obvious candidate for the value of the discount rate is the real return on equity. However, the
27equity-premium on equity is around 6% or more for the post-war period, see also Fase (1997) or
Eicholtz et al. (2000). In our opinion, this is way too high for a number of reasons. First, the
government is able to smooth intergenerational risks associated with macroeconomic shocks,
which the private sector cannot. Second, non-diversiable risks on the stock market are arguably
much larger for stocks than for labour incomes in view of the relatively stable labour income
share. A real risk-premium equal to p = :02 seems therefore reasonable as an upper bound.
We assume further that ination does not erode real wages and thereby the present value of
life-time earnings. That is, we assume that nominal wages are indexed to ination. Since we
estimated the age-earnings proles on the basis of a cross-section of wages we do not need to
correct further for the effects of ination if we assume that the CPI's for every age cohort are the
same.
Finally we assume that each graduate enters the labour market directly after graduation and
remains in the labour market until 65 years. We also present some calculations in which the
retirement age is increased to 70 years.
Given the assumptions made so far, we compute the expected PV of earnings of workers with










a;i;s; j  wa;i;s; jLa;i;s; j. Note that a one percentage change in the growth rate g, or interest
rate r (risk-premium p) has an almost identical effect on the PV.
Table 4.2 presents the computed PV's of earnings as of age 25, i.e., t = 25, for the different
types of education, gender and whether a higher vocational or university type of education is
followed. For all assumptions used in this and all other calculations, we refer the reader to the list
in the appendix. First, from table 4.2 can be seen that the different subjects earn different
streams of incomes.7 Clearly, economics, technical, and law education have the highest present
value of life-time earnings for both higher vocational and university education. Behavioural,
social, arts and cultural types of education are at the lowest end of the present value of earnings.
It is apparent that differences in the present values of education can be large, certainly for the
behavioural, social, arts and cultural types of education compared to economics and law. The
differences between higher vocational and university education are also large. University
education pays off in terms of income generally hundreds of thousands euro more than higher
vocational education. Men also seem to prot relatively more from doing a university education
than women. Further, the differences of the PV of life-time earnings for men and women echo
the estimation results that women have less steep earnings proles in addition to lower
7 Note that we do not make a social cost-benet analysis here. This requires additional estimations on foregone
earnings that should be taken into account. Furthermore, we potentially have to take into account of ability biases, the
role of the tax system to evaluate the private returns, et cetera. This is left for future research.
28Table 4.2 Present value of life-time earnings in thousands of euro
Men Women
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
Agriculture 899 1209 446 676
Science 1121 612
Technical 1017 1296 415 863
Medical 792 1133 336 640
Economics 1053 1357 443 798
Law 868 1289 367 736
Behavioural & social 794 905 360 545
Arts 546 285
Languages & culture 811 519
Teachers 770 365
participation rates than men. Differences between men and women are quite large reecting
mainly labour force participation characteristics.
295 Costs of education
We need to compute the present value of the costs of education. As stated before, we assume that
all costs of tuition are evenly shared among graduates. We do however distinguish between
graduates from higher vocational/university education and graduates with longer durations of
their education. Generally, students in low-cost education types cross-subsidise students in
high-cost education types. This is also the case in the current system with at tuition rates.
We conne the analysis solely to the direct costs for education and the grants that are
currently given to students to compensate for costs of living and foregone earnings. We thus
ignore the opportunity costs of education that students incur while learning. Our purpose here is
to relate current government outlays to future incomes of students. It is therefore not necessary
to derive opportunity costs for this calculation.
Further, we exclude costs of health care in university education, e.g. the medical hospitals,
that render the medical studies expensive. We do the same for the expenditures on scientic
research at universities, and arts at higher vocational schools, e.g. arts academies, conservatories,
acting schools, etc. These types of education are heavily subsidised in addition to the standard
government contributions. The reason for giving these subsidies are presumed consumption
and production externalities. In this research we do not discuss the validity of subsidies to these
subjects and assume that these subsidies are also given when students pay a substantial fraction
of the costs of their education.
In order to relate the benets of education to the costs of education we have to assign present
values of costs to various education types. Because men and women are treated equally we only
need to consider the present value of the government expenditures per type of education, per
student. Costs of grants are evenly distributed among the various types of education, and among
higher vocational and university students.
The government provides students with (income dependent) grants, education services that
are below the cost price and pays for the student's travelling expenses, and some other relatively
minor things. Table 5.1 summarises the costs per student per year for higher vocational studies
and university education.
Table 5.1 Yearly costs of education in thousands of euro
Costa Grantb Tuitionc
Higher vocational 4.5 3.384 1.0
University 3.9 3.554 1.1
Sources: Ministry of Education (2000, 2001).
a) Average institutional cost per student, based on average costs per student (Ministry of Education, 2001, pp. 61, 71).
b) Average outlays on basic grants, income dependent grants, travelling card (OV-kaart), partner and one-parent refunds, and some other minor
expenses (Ministry of Education, 2000, p. 83).
c) Statutory tuition rates (Ministry of Education, 2000, pp. 63, 73).
30We further estimate the average number of years that students are enrolled in higher education.
Both university and higher vocational education have a nominal length of 4 years. In practice
however students are enrolled for a longer time. We assume that students are enrolled 5 years in
higher education. Data from Statistics Netherlands (2000c, p.19) indicate that these gures are a
little too low for the cohorts that graduated in 1996/1997. However, the same gures show a
clear trend that average duration of education is falling over time.
Apart from the opportunity costs of education, students have to pay up-front tuition fees. As
such, students contribute to the nancing of education. However, we use a benchmark in our
calculations where all costs are deferred to later stages in life and tuition rates upon enrolment
are zero. This is similar to the Australian system if students choose to defer tuition fees.
Furthermore, we assume that all (income dependent) grants that are currently given to students
are replaced by loans/equity.
No external subsidies in the form of grants or below cost pricing of education are given in the
baseline scenario and all costs, both tuition and the grants, are paid for by the students
themselves in the future. The reason for choosing this reference point is that it facilitates the
comparisons of the current system of education nance and income contingent systems of
education nance, where subsidies possibly enter in an ex post fashion, as was explained before.
We calculated different nancing schedules for various levels of education subsidies s per
student per year. The reason is that there is no need to abolish all education subsidies. In the
introduction we presented a number of arguments in favour of education subsidies. We use 4
categories of education subsidies as given in table 5.2. The zero subsidy regime corresponds to
the case where all current outlays on education (grants and institutional costs) are replaced by
loans/equity. The low, middle and high subsidy scenarios correspond to 25%, 50% and 75% of
current total outlays. In the current system where the contribution on the part of students is 12%
and 13% of the direct outlays on education for higher vocational and university education
respectively.1
For the various subsidy regimes we have computed the yearly savings in government
expenditures on education. In the remainder of the analysis we do not consider various options
to spend the free resources. The government may want to use the proceeds for lower taxes or
higher government expenditures, or reduce government debt. A discussion on these matters is
beyond the scope of this research.
Table 5.3 shows the savings in government expenditure per year for the various subsidy levels.
Savings on government expenditures per year amount to 459 million euro if the subsidies are
lowered to 6,355 euro, and increase to 3261 million euro if students have to pay for everything
1 These gures are derived as follows. We take the sum of grants and institutional costs minus the own contributions
by the students and divide this through the sum of grants and institutional costs. For the share of government
expenditures in total costs at higher vocational education we get (4.5+3.884-1.0)/(4.5+3.884)=.88, and for university
education we get (3.9+3.554-1.1)/(3.9+3.554)=.87, see also table 5.1.
31Table 5.2 Education subsidies and level of funds (thousands of euro)
Subsidy level s Loan/equity D Average sa
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
Zero 0.000 0.000 8.421 8.569 0.000
Low (25%) 2.105 2.142 6.325 6.426 2.119
Middle (50%) 4.210 4.285 4.210 4.285 4.237
High (75%) 6.315 6.426 2.105 2.142 6.355
Current system (88%) 7.377 7.434 0.000 0.000 7.398
a) Average subsidy computed using the relative number of students in higher vocational and university education as weights.
and the government stops subsidising education.
Table 5.3 Savings on government outlays (mln euro)
Subsidy Average level Savings
(x1000 euro) Higher vocational University Total
Current 7.398 0 0 0
High 6.355 239 213 459
Middle 4.237 771 607 1393
Low 2.119 1304 1000 2327
Zero 0 1837 1393 3261
Note: Number of students enrolled: Higher vocational 282,000, University 158,800. Average cost per student: higher vocational 8,420 euro university
8,569 euro.
We can derive the present value of costs (PVC) of a student with education type i and subject j







where the present value of costs is denoted in values as of age t. ao denotes the year in which the
education is started and a is the year in which the education is ended. In our calculations we set
ao for higher vocational studies at ao = 17 years of age, and for university education at ao = 18
years of age. As already discussed, we set a = 22 for higher vocational education, a = 24 for
technical university education, a = 25 for medical university education and a = 23 for other
university education. s is the subsidy on total costs of education, assumed to be equal across the
board.
We assume that costs also increase at a rate of g% per year. The reason is that the main costs
of education are wage payments to teachers, researchers, and so on. Also a risk-premium in the
costs may be included. Main costs are wage costs in education that may be subject to similar
risks as wages of educated workers, which is the reason for including a risk-premium in the
calculations of the present value of earnings. Table 5.4 shows the present values of costs per type
32of education. (Note that all present values are based on discounting to age 25).








Behavioural & social 45 45
Arts 45
Languages & culture 45
Teachers 45
336 Income uncertainty
The crux of the proposed education nance regimes is that they provide insurance (at least partly)
to graduates against the possibility that they cannot pay back their loans. To analyse this
uncertainty we have to know to what extent uncertainty inuences the expected earnings when
graduated. In order to proxy for the effects of uncertainty we employ the standard deviation of
the residuals from the estimations to measure the spread of incomes around the estimated
wage-prole. A larger standard deviation in the residuals implies that there is more unexplained
variation in wages. Therefore, the standard deviation is a potentially suited measure for income
uncertainty. However, deviations from mean incomes are of course also attributable to all factors
we omitted in the estimations, such as labour market conditions, personal characteristics, etc.
For our analysis this is not a problem because, in general, the nancing schemes cannot be
conditioned on the omitted characteristics such as individual abilities, or industries where people
work, etc.1 This is a relatively crude method to cope with uncertainty in earnings. Ideally one
would like to employ panel data to determine income uncertainty and income mobility effects.
With the data at hand this is not doable. Therefore, we cannot capture differences in
earnings-proles over the life-cycle for various risk-classes, since this requires measures of
income mobility over time in the income distribution. One may correct for heterogeneity
between different risk classes by employing, for example, quantile regressions to capture
differences in life-time wage proles. 2 However, a priori it is not clear whether this is a correct
procedure in light of the unmeasured mobility effects.
Rinnooy Kan et al. (1988) compare the outcomes of an analysis based on panel data and on a
cross-section - as we employ here. They conclude that both approaches yields quantitatively very
similar results. So we do not expect to bias the results to a great extent with our method.
A log-normal income distribution is a widely used approximation to the real income
distribution. Under the assumption that these residuals from our estimations are normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation se around the mean income along the
estimated income proles we generate income classes depending on the distance from mean
incomes. We divide our estimated proles of each of our 32 proles in quintiles. Each of which
contains 20% of the students. The lowest quintile has the 20% of the students with the lowest
incomes, the highest quintile contains the 20% of the students with the highest incomes. In
1 Again, these deviations from the estimated age-earnings proles are potentially endogenous. The reason is that
the slopes of the earnings proles are affected by occupational choices, abilities of graduates and so on. Only more
sophisticated econometric techniques can correct for this. We do not do this. The reason is that our wage proles
will still on average reect the wage prole of the graduates, which is the relevant variable in our calculations. And, as
already noted in the text, repayment schedules cannot be made contingent on ability, occupation and so on.
2 We did estimate quantile regressions for the ve income categories used, but this only marginally affected our
results.
34order to dene the mean incomes in each of these classes we make use of the properties of the
standard normal distribution. The mean income of the k-th, k = 1,...,5 class of students is dened
as  omitting education type and gender subscripts:
lnwak  lnwa+seF 1((2k 1)=10); (6.1)
where lnwak is the mean of predicted income at age a in class k, lnwa is mean predicted income,
and F 1 is the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution with mean zero and unit
variance.
The total number of categories of students has by now increased from 32 to 160. We
therefore allow for heterogeneity between the sexes, higher vocational and university education,
and the various education types and within all these categories due to uncertainty. In gures 6.1,
6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, we plotted estimated wage proles for the various classes for the economics
education category. We could also have taken any other education type, but this does not add to
our understanding because the xed effects would only shift the proles of log(wages) linearly
upwards or downwards so that the qualitative effects remain the same.
Figure 6.1 Wage proles by different income classes women higher vocational












35Figure 6.2 Wage proles by different income classes men higher vocational












Figure 6.3 Wage proles by different income classes women university












36Figure 6.4 Wage proles by different income classes men university












377 Redistribution and tax distortions
There is potentially redistribution from high earning graduates towards low earning graduates.
Therefore, the distribution of the student body over the different subjects matters. To capture
these effects, we employ the number of students enrolled in each education category. It happens
to be the case that the high earning types of education for men, economics, law, and technical
studies, are very popular. For women we nd that medical, social and behavioural, economics,
and law studies are the most popular. These numbers suggest that students tend to choose the
nancially most benecial subjects. An exception is the teacher category that is relatively popular,
but teachers do not have very high life-time earnings. Table 7.1 shows the number of students in
the various education categories.
Table 7.1 Number of students enrolled in 1997/98.
Men Women
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
Agriculture 6100 2200 3200 1700
Science 8400 4400
Technical 44400 19100 7900 3900
Medical 5200 7700 20100 10800
Economics 29691a 17800 11603a 6300
Law 20209a 12100 24097a 13100
Behavioural & social 9200 10200 30100 19400
Arts 7900 9500
Languages & culture 7700 14000
Teachers 16900 35900
Source: Statistics Netherlands (1999, p.9, p.12)
a) Numbers of students enrolled in law and economics at the higher vocational level are calculated by weighting the total number of students in these
areas with the corresponding ratios of law (economics) to total number of students in law and economics at the university level.
We take into account the potentially distortionary effect of both the GT (and ICL) on life-time
labour supply, which comprises hours worked and participation effects. The graduate tax may
also reduce post-initial schooling efforts which result in a smaller effective tax base. Similarly,
student may increase tax avoidance activities by shifting income to the black circuit. All these
effects reduce the base of the income tax and thereby the base from which repayments are
funded. As a consequence, the government loses tax revenues.
We have to note here that, from a welfare perspective, not the whole increase in the tax
burden can be viewed as a distortionary loss for two reasons. First, we do not consider rebating
the savings in government outlays. If government savings were rebated through tax reductions,
distortionary losses of increasing private contributions may vanish. The reason is that in the
latter case there is only a shift in the tax burden from the average tax payer, i.e. non-graduates,
towards graduates. It depends on the elasticities of labour supply of both groups whether there is
38an increase in welfare costs of taxation. If non-graduates have higher (lower) elasticities of labour
supply than graduates there is a welfare gain (loss), since the tax system becomes more (less)
efcient.
Second, the system has insurance elements that cannot be fully regarded as an increase in the
average tax burden. If the repayment conditions were actuarially fair, i.e., for every graduate there
is no increase in the expected tax burden, behaviour does not change. Tax distortions only arise
as a consequence of inevitable redistribution. Therefore, one should interpret the welfare losses
of taxes computed here as a conservative upper-bound.
We assume that the effective marginal rate (q) without the graduate tax repayment equals
50%. This is the marginal rate in the second tax bracket in the old tax system and corresponds
closely to the top bracket in the new tax system (52%). The marginal tax burden increases in the
GT (and ICL) systems, since students contribute to their education through the tax system. For
the computations of the revenue loss we assume an average tax rate equal to 40%. Bovenberg and
Cnossen (1998) estimate the effective average rate on labour income equal to about 45%.
Caminada et al. (1996) nd a much lower average of about 35% rate when deductions for
mortgage payments and pension premiums are taken into account. CPB (2001b) nds average
tax wedges on income equal to about 40% for workers with modal incomes.
Empirical evidence suggests that (uncompensated) labour supply elasticities are small to
negligible for men and small but positive for women, see e.g. Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and
Heckman (1986), Hanssen and Stuart (1985). However, taxable income may respond more
elastically to the increased repayment rates. Gruber and Saez (2001) nd that the average tax
elasticity of labour income is .4. Feldstein (1999) nds very high elasticities of taxable income
around 1.
As base-line values we take for men an uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supply
E = :1 and for women E = :5. This gives an average elasticity of taxable income equal to .3, which
is in line with Gruber and Saez (2001). Based on these elasticities we compute the life-time














L . To calculate the change in the tax burden under a graduate
tax regime, we used an (rst-order) approximation, since the tax is endogenous. First, we derived
to which equals the graduate tax computed in the absence of a change in labour supply. Based on
this increase in the tax-burden we adjusted life-time labour supply to calculate the new graduate
tax adjusted for labour supply effects. As it turns out, labour supply effects are very modest, so
that this approximation is fairly accurate. For the ICL scheme, we choose repayment rates in
advance, i.e., to = t. Since the repayment rate is exogenous, the change in labour supply is
precisely measured under an ICL scheme.
398 Loan system as a benchmark
We assume in all the calculations that follow, that the whole system as it currently operates
remains in place with the difference that tuition fees are abolished and grants are replaced by
loans. The major change is that the government nances the costs in advance and collects
repayments from students after graduation through the tax system. We assume that there is in
principle no differentiation in costs between the subjects, only as regards to the level of education
(higher vocational and university) and to the length of education. So there is a cross subsidy from
cheap to expensive subjects (this is also the case in the current system).
The government borrows the funds to provide students with the `grants' and the institutional
costs of education. It does so by means of the issue of government bonds and repays its debt with
the repayments received from the students as they work. We assume further that the income of
(full-time) working partners is not included in the repayment scheme, i.e., there is no income
check on family income.
In our articial benchmark of a loan system no individual default occurs, because the
government simply varies the repayment conditions for every student exactly so as to cover
principal plus interest. Our only purpose here is to calculate the life-time repayment burden with
an ordinary loan and compare this with an GT/ICL later on. As noted before, this is a purely
theoretical construct. Table 8.1 shows the average fractions of income per year that the students
in each category have to repay under a loan system when subsidies are zero (s = 0 euro) and the
yearly loan (D) given to students equals 8,420 euro for higher vocational students and 8,569 euro
for university students.1 This implies that yearly private costs increase. For higher vocational
students this is 8,420 - 1.0 = 7,377 euro, and for university students the increase equals 8,569 -
1.1 = 7,434 euro.
First, we concentrate on the means - indicated by the bold numbers in the third category. For
men with university education, the fraction of life-time income repaid varies from 3.5% for
economics, law, technical, agricultural and medical studies to 5% for behavioural and social
studies and arts and languages. For women we see that repayment burdens are higher than for
men. At the university level the repayment rates are in the order of 6% for technical subjects,
economics and law education, to more than 8% for behavioural and social studies and arts and
languages. This is due to their lower life-time present value of incomes, and, more importantly,
their lower labour supply.
Repayment burdens for men with higher vocational types of education are comparable,
although slightly higher than men with university education, varying from 4-8%. For women at
the higher vocational level repayments are substantial and higher compared to women with
university education, ranging from 10-15%. This is mainly the consequence of lower labour
supply gures at higher vocational education. Clearly, women with higher vocational education
1 Tables for the other subsidy regimes are available upon request.
40Table 8.1 Fractions of life-time incomes repaid under pure loan system
University Higher vocational
quintile men women men women
Agriculture 1 6.4 12.3 8.8 19.7
2 4.6 8.5 6.3 13.2
3 3.7 6.6 5.0 10.0
4 3.0 5.2 3.9 7.6
5 2.1 3.6 2.8 5.1





Technical 1 7.2 11.5 7.8 21.1
2 5.2 8.0 5.6 14.2
3 4.1 6.2 4.4 10.8
4 3.3 4.8 3.5 8.2
5 2.4 3.4 2.5 5.5
Medical 1 9.5 18.0 10.0 26.1
2 6.9 12.5 7.1 17.5
3 5.5 9.7 5.6 13.3
4 4.4 7.6 4.5 10.1
5 3.2 5.3 3.2 6.8
Economics 1 5.7 10.4 7.5 19.8
2 4.1 7.2 5.4 13.3
3 3.3 5.6 4.2 10.1
4 2.6 4.4 3.4 7.6
5 1.9 3.0 2.4 5.1
Law 1 6.0 11.3 9.1 23.9
2 4.4 7.8 6.5 16.0
3 3.5 6.1 5.1 12.2
4 2.8 4.7 4.1 9.2
5 2.0 3.3 2.9 6.2
Behavioural & social 1 8.6 15.2 10.0 24.3
2 6.2 10.6 7.1 16.3
3 5.0 8.2 5.6 12.4
4 4.0 6.4 4.4 9.4
5 2.9 4.5 3.2 6.3
Arts, languages 1 9.6 16.0 14.5 30.7
2 6.9 11.1 10.3 20.6
3 5.5 8.7 8.2 15.7
4 4.4 6.7 6.5 11.9
5 3.2 4.7 4.6 8.0





Note: Higher vocational students borrow 8,420 euro per year and university students borrow 8,569 euro per year. This is equal to total current
educational expenditures per student, including tuition fees from students.
41are the rst to get into repayment problems under a loan regime.
The general picture is that economics, law, technical and behavioural subjects have the lowest
repayment rates. Intermediate repayment rates are found in agriculture and languages at the
university levels. High repayment burdens are found in sciences, health, arts and teacher
education. This is due to the fact that in rst group of studies present values of earnings are
relatively higher, whereas in the last group the opposite holds.
Second, we concentrate on the difference in repayment burdens within the various education
types. We see that there is substantial heterogeneity in fractions of income repaid within
education groups. For men with university education, the repayments are roughly 75% higher if
graduates belong to the rst quintile compared to the mean - the third quintile. Repayment
burdens fall to about half of the mean for the highest quintiles. For women and men at higher
vocational education the lowest income quintile has repayments that are about two times higher
than the mean in each category.
This picture is roughly the same for the various subjects, higher vocational and university
education. We can see that especially women in lower income quintiles get into repayment
problems, because they have to repay sometimes 20% or more of their incomes in order to repay
their debts. The variations in earnings follow the general pattern of the standard deviation of the
residuals in the estimations.
429 Graduate taxes
Under a GT system all students are treated equally and they have to repay a constant fraction of
their incomes during their whole lives. According to the formula (3.9), we can compute the
repayment rate to cover all outstanding debts, so that no aggregate default occurs and all risks are
borne by the students themselves. This also entails redistribution from high income earners to
low income earners.
Table 9.1 shows the graduate taxes required to cover all outstanding government debt. We
rst concentrate on the base line case in which no subsidies are given. In that case the
repayment rate, or GT, equals 5.9%. When we compare this rate with the various rates we
encountered in table 8.1, it becomes clear that there is a lot of redistribution involved. The reason
is that with a graduate tax all elements in table 8.1 are equal to 5.9. Thus, there is a very strong
compression in repayment obligations. As such our calculations show that income insurance is
substantial. There is insurance/redistribution in particular from men to women, from high
earning subjects to low earning subjects, and from university to higher vocational education.
We can at least conclude that pooling of risks is highly benecial in order to reduce the
uncertainties involved of doing a particular type of education. Moreover, on average the absolute
increases in the tax rates for the high earning subjects are relatively modest compared with the
decreases  in absolute terms  in tax rates for the subjects that are relatively less nancially
benecial. This effect can be attributed mainly to the fact that there is a relatively large number of
male students in the high earning subjects.
Table 9.1 Graduate taxes (%)
s = 0 s = 2.119 s = 4,237 s = 6,355
Baseline 5.9 4.4 2.9 1.4
g = :01 ( r = :04) 7.6 5.7 3.8 1.9
g = :03 ( r = :03) 4.4 3.4 2.2 1.1
p = :01 / r = :04 7.6 5.7 3.7 1.9
p = :02 / r = :05 9.7 7.2 4.7 2.3
Retirement age = 70 5.3 4.0 2.6 1.3
Elasticity high 6.1 4.4 2.9 1.5
Elasticity zero 5.7 4.3 2.9 1.4
+25% funds 7.4 5.5 3.6 1.8
-25% funds 4.4 3.3 2.2 1.1
Nominal duration 4.0 2.8 1.6 0.4
The GT is reduced when the government increases subsidies. The reason is that graduates
obtain fewer funds. With a low average subsidy of 2,119 euro the graduate tax equals about 4.4%,
with subsidies in the middle it falls to 2.9% and with a high subsidy of 6,355 euro the tax rate is
only 1.4%. However, government savings on education expenditures also decrease when
43subsidies are brought in line with current levels, see below.
In the rest of the table we have computed the consequences for the GT when the crucial
parameters of the model are changed. First, we looked at a 1%-point lower rate of wage growth.
This corresponds as well with a higher real interest rate of 1%-point.1 Clearly, lower wage growth
or higher real interest rates has important consequences for the GT, for is has to increase with
more than 1%-point for every %-point reduction in the growth rate of wages.
Similarly, a positive value of the required risk premium of 2% increases the graduate tax to
9.7% in the base-line scenario. This also corresponds to an increase in the real interest rate of
2% per year. Clearly, unfavourable conditions with regards to the interest rate are importantly
affecting the repayment conditions. In the case the real interest rate equals 2%, a graduate tax of
about 4.5% is sufcient to let the graduates pay for all the costs of education.
The statutory retirement age may increase in years to in come. We calculated the
consequences of increasing the retirement age to 70 years. Only modest decreases in repayment
rates are found when retirement age increases. This is caused by the fact that revenues further
away in the future are heavier discounted. Interestingly, repayment rates are not very sensitive
with respect to labour supply elasticities. We calculated cases in which labour supply effects are
absent, i.e., E = 0, for both men and women, and where labour supply is more elastic, that is,
E = :25 for men and E = 1 for women. These are upper bounds that are found in the literature.
Very modest increases are found when labour supply elasticities are set at levels that can be
considered very high. Based on these gures we may say that moral hazard in labour supply after
graduation is potentially not a very important factor that drives repayment conditions.
Under a graduate tax system, students may wish to have more funds than in the current
system, because the capital market imperfection is tackled and students may suffer less from risk
aversion. We compute the levels of the graduate tax in case the government increases the funds
available to students. We compute the consequences of an increase of 25% in total funds, this
corresponds to an increase in (average) grants from 2,884 euro per year to 4,989 euro per year
for higher vocational students and from 3,554 euro to 5,719 euro per year for university students
in the base-line scenario. In the other scenarios the increase in the level of funds is smaller
because the initial size of equity/loan is smaller. This gure is picked somewhat arbitrarily and
may be at the high end. On the other hand, the graduate tax may also reduce the amount of
funds that students wish to have since total costs of education increase. We also analyse the
effects of a decrease in the funds made available by the government with 25%.
The latter calculation approximately corresponds as well to the total elimination of drop-outs
in higher education. The overall drop-out rate in higher education is 19% and university
education has a drop-out rate of 28%, see Statistics Netherlands (1995, p.32). Accordingly, a
decrease in average costs of education of about 25% results if all drop-outs are eliminated. The




44government may want to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection under a GT/ICL scheme. It
can do so by means of selection procedures or allow universities to expel non functioning
students, the so called `binding study advice'.
Linear effects on the levels of the repayment rates are found when the amounts borrowed are
increased (decreased) with 25%. The corresponding GT also increases (decreases) with 25%. The
reduction in average duration of the study to nominal length has similar effects as a reduction of
the total costs with 25%. The latter ndings imply that moral hazard effects while enrolling in
education are important for the repayment conditions. If the government wishes to make the
nancing system more attractive, reducing drop outs and shortening enrolment duration is
potentially effective to reduce the costs of education.
We also compute the consequences of a shorter average duration of enrolment in higher
education. We compute the GT in case all students study for the nominal length of their
education. In order to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection, the government may also want
to set stricter norms with respect to the duration at which students are allowed to be enrolled in
higher education.
All the consequences of changing parameters turn out to become more modest at higher
education subsidies. All said, we have to be careful to draw conclusions about the exact size of
the repayment rate, since it turns out to be sensitive to the assumptions made as regards the rate
of wage growth, the interest rate and the required risk-premium, but not with regard to the
labour supply effects.
Finally, we computed the loss in tax revenues per year as a consequence of increasing the
effective tax burden. To that end, we rst determined the total present value of lost life-time tax
revenues per student. By making the steady state assumption, we convert the loss in tax revenues
to an equivalent increase in costs per student per year. Finally, we computed the total yearly tax
loss by summing all average revenue losses per student over the whole student population












where qj, Ni, Li;n, ao, a denote the yearly equivalent of the total tax loss per student of education
level j, the number of students in education level j, the present value of the life-time revenue
loss per student of education level j, the age at which education is started, and the age at which
education is ended, respectively.2 In table 9.2 we computed for the base-line values the yearly
revenue losses for the different values of the graduate tax.
2 Here, we make an approximation by assuming that students in medical and technical subjects are 5 years enrolled.
We do not expect that this approximation has large effects on the estimated tax losses, since the fraction of students
enrolled in these studies is relatively low compared with the total number of students. In any case, in this procedure
tax losses will be over-estimated, because these medical and technical students typically have shorter working lives
because they study for a longer time.
45Table 9.2 Yearly equivalent of lost tax revenues and net savings (bln. euro)
baseline E = 0 E high
s = 0 euro t = 5:9% t = 5:7% t = 6:1%
Gross savings 3.2 3.2 3.2
Lost revenues 0.7 0 1.6
Net savings 2.5 3.2 1.6
s = 2;119 euro t = 4:4% t = 4:3% t = 4:4%
Gross savings 2.3 2.3 2.3
Lost revenues 0.5 0 1.1
Net savings 1.8 2.3 1.2
s = 4;237 euro t = 2:9% t = 2:9% t = 2:9%
Gross savings 1.4 1.4 1.4
Lost revenues 0.2 0 0.7
Net savings 1.2 1.4 0.7
s = 6;355 euro t = 1:5% t = 1:4% t = 1:5%
Gross savings 0.5 0.5 0.5
Lost Revenues 0.2 0 .4
Net savings 0.3 0.5 .1
From table 9.2 can be concluded that losses in tax revenues with a graduate tax can be substantial
compared to the savings on government outlays. As noted before, the savings on government
outlays may be rebated through general tax reductions so that welfare costs of taxation may
disappear. In the current discussion, the government savings are simply taken out of the
economy.
Potential revenue losses critically hinge on the presumed labour supply elasticities. For the
most reasonable values of the labour supply elasticities (base-line scenario) we see that the loss of
tax revenues is about 1/4 of the total reduction in government outlays. We calculate that net
yearly savings on government outlays with a graduate tax are ranging from .3 to 2.5 bln euro if
the subsidies on higher education are decreased from 6,355 euro on average per student to 0
euro per student. In the case where labour supply elasticities are zero, full gross savings are
realised as net savings, since there are no revenue losses. However, if the labour supply
elasticities are set at upper bounds found in the literature, net savings on government
expenditures are very much reduced due to lower tax revenues.
4610 An income contingent loan system
10.1 ICL with full risk pooling
In an ICL system with full risk pooling all costs of default are shared amongst graduates  as in
the GT system. The only notable difference is that there is a limit on the amount that graduates
repay after graduation. This limit is determined by the default premium r see also section 3.
Under an ICL system, r determines how long graduates remain in the program. The lower is r,
the quicker they have repaid their debts. For effective insurance to occur r must take some
positive value. As the default premium increases an ICL with full risk pooling is in the limit equal
to the graduate tax system. Then, redistributional aspects enter more and more in the default
premium as in the GT. r should then be denoted more appropriately as a solidarity premium.
In table 10.1 we have computed the repayment rates for the various subsidy regimes and for
varying the default/solidarity premiums r. We have used the baseline values of the other
parameters. The values of the repayment rates are obtained by solving the budget constraint for t
of the system as given in equation (3.4). The risk premium and the repayment rate must
simultaneously keep the books of the system balanced.
Table 10.1 Repayment rates t (%) in ICL with full risk pooling.
r = :01 r = :02 r = :03 r = :04 GT (r = ¥)
s = 0 euro 10.3 7.8 6.9 6.4 5.9
s = 2;119 euro 7.5 5.8 5.1 4.8 4.4
s = 4;237 euro 4.9 3.8 3.4 3.2 2.9
s = 6;355 euro 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
We see that the repayment rates increase relative to the repayment rates encountered under a
graduate tax. The reason is that the high-earning graduates are leaving the system earlier so that
the low-earning graduates have to pay more of their incomes to repay their debts. Again we can
see that the spread in repayment rates in the various subsidy regimes is reduced, when we
compare the repayment rates in table 10.1 with those encountered in table 9.1. However, at very
low levels of r (r = :01), the effective insurance against the bad states of nature has importantly
diminished compared to the graduate tax system. The reason is that high income earners
contribute little to solidarity. Only women with higher vocational education benet from the
insurance characteristics, i.e., transfers from high income earners.
Furthermore, we see relatively large reductions in repayment rates when r is increased at low
initial levels of the default premium. An increase in the default/solidarity premium implies that
high earning graduates repay more and remain repaying for a longer period of their lives. This
improves the insurance/redistributional characteristics of the system, so that repayment rates
can be lower. The reductions in t level off when r gets higher. The repayment rates converge to
47the values of the graduate tax when the default premium is increased to about 12%. The
reduction in government expenditures for the various subsidy regimes are assumed to be equal
to that of the graduate tax as no external losses of default are present.1
10.2 ICL with (partial) risk shifting
One may also design the ICL system where costs of default are (partly) shifted to society at large.
In the Australian system, students never repay more than the principal (the real interest rate is
zero). That implies that there is no ex post redistribution from lucky students to unlucky
students. Subsidies on education now enter in an ex post fashion, however, rather than ex ante,
since the costs of default are funded from government budget. Still there can be reductions in
total government expenditures on education. The reason is that subsidies are also given to
successful graduates, whereas in a risk-shifting arrangement only subsidies are given only to
unsuccessful students. In that case, replacing ex ante subsidies for every student by ex post
subsidies - only given to unlucky graduates - makes the education system more egalitarian, since
the unlucky graduates have lower incomes than the average graduates.
We present calculations for various (exogenous) values of the default premium and the
repayment rate. The problem here is to pick some reasonable values in order to illustrate the
important mechanisms. The reason is that the number of possible ICL-schemes that one can
think of is innitely large. In the Australian system there is no risk-pooling so that r = 0. This is
a natural lower bound. Rinnooy Kan et al. (1998) use a default-premium r equal to 1.3% to cover
costs of default and early mortality. They do discuss also the possibility of a solidarity premium.
As a benchmark we take r = :02. This gure implies that the effective interest rate for students
increases to r+r = :05 in the base line case. We also present calculations for a default premium
of r = :04 which is our upper bound and r gets more the character of a solidarity premium. We
nally calculate the consequences if we let r go to innity. These calculations then correspond to
a graduate tax with partial risk-shifting.
For the repayment rates we take values t = :02, t = :03, and t = :04. These values are
somewhat arbitrarily chosen, but probably represent the politically feasible range. Finally, we
restrict our subsidy regimes to s = 2;199 euro, and s = 4;237 euro. The high and zero subsidy
regimes (s = 0 euro and s = 6;355 euro) are probably not very interesting from a policy
perspective. For these 24 combinations of repayment rates, solidarity premiums and education
subsidies we present calculations below.
1 This depends on the timing of tax revenues and the elasticities of labour supply over the life-cycle. Tax losses with an
ICL are generally larger compared to a GT because tax smoothing over the life-cycle is optimal as the GT does, rather
than concentrating it at the young ages in an ICL. However, tax losses may be smaller if the elasticity of labour supply
is smaller at young ages, the period to which the tax burden is shifted. Given that repayment periods are generally
very long, we are inclined to think that the difference is relatively minor.
48In order to assess the behaviour of the ICL scheme we also present some additional statistics.
First, we calculate the so called debt-gap. This is the fraction of total outstanding debt that has
been repaid. The remaining fraction is the social loss as a fraction of outstanding debts. The
latter is what Rinnooy Kan et al. (1988) dub the social risk of loans. Second, we calculate the
fraction of students that are able to repay their debts in full. This is denoted the debt-count. Third,
we computed the average number of years it takes to repay debt, for those who do pay back in
full, see also Barr and Faulkingham (1993).
We also compute the average costs of default for graduates with higher vocational and
university education. The costs of default are derived in similar fashion as the losses in tax
revenues. First we calculated - for given repayment rate t and default premium r - the net
present value of default costs. Then we transformed the present value of default costs to the
equivalent yearly rise in education expenditures per student that generates the same present












where di, and DLi denote the yearly equivalent increase in costs of education of education type i,
and the default loss per student of education type i. The other variables are dened above. Here
we make an approximation by assuming that students in medical and technical subjects are 5
years enrolled.2
Table 10.2 and table 10.3 present the results for the s = 2;119 euro and 4;237 euro regimes
where students pay 75% and 50% of total current costs respectively. For the low subsidy regime
we see that the debt gap is substantial. Large fractions of outstanding debts are not repaid with
the repayment rates and default premiums chosen here. Even with a repayment rate equal to 4%
of total life-time income and a default premium of r = :04 about 11% of outstanding debt is not
repaid. This is less so in the high subsidy regime, where the debt gap may be close to 100% or
more if the repayment rate is 4% and the default premium is 2% or higher. Furthermore, we see
that a substantial fraction of students in all scenario's does not repay in full. Of course, the
number of students that repays falls if the default premium increases, since it takes longer to
repay debts for given repayment rates. The average duration of of repayment is long, i.e., about
30 years or more.
If one regards the base-line parameters and tax and default rates as plausible, it is not
surprising that the private sector is reluctant to provide students with substantial loans. The low
debt gaps require substantial risk premia and repayment rates. The very low fractions of students
that repays in full and the long periods of repayment make education loans very costly from an
administrative point of view. As such, the role for government intervention seems vindicated.
2 Again,we do not expect thatthis approximation haslarge effects on the estimatedcosts of default,since the fraction
of students enrolled in these studies is relatively low compared with the total number of students.
49Yearly costs of default decrease if the government increases subsidy rates. Students have to
borrow less if the government is nancing larger parts of the costs of education. Reducing ex
ante subsidies on education by increasing private contributions yield marginally decreasing
savings on government outlays because ex post subsidies on education increase. Given the
repayment scheme (t, r), lowering education subsidies ex ante, implies that more costs of
default that are shifted to society at large, so that education subsidies ex post increase. From the
gures on the government savings we can see that the reductions in government outlays are
almost similar in both regimes for identical repayments schemes (t, r). More generally, only by
increasing the repayment rate or the default/solidarity premium, substantial savings on
aggregate government outlays can be achieved. If the repayment rate or risk premium increases,
we can see that costs of default decrease substantially. The reason is that students now have to
repay a larger fraction of their incomes to repay their debts, so that less default occurs.
Consequently, savings on government outlays are increasing. We see in the middle subsidy
regime that aggregate costs of default eventually become negative. Due to high default/solidarity
premiums, graduates repay more than they have borrowed.
Replacing ex ante with ex post subsidies has of course distributional effects. Whereas
everyone benets from ex ante subsidies, only the graduates with incomes insufcient to repay
their debts benet from the insurance aspects of the ICL. Consequently, replacing ex ante with ex
post subsidies results in a more equal distribution of income across graduates. This is the
insurance element in an GT/ICL system, that is absent in schemes with education subsidies.
Moreover, we can say that, more generally, ex post subsidies are more equitable than ex ante
subsidies.
If r ! ¥ results converge to that of a GT (with partial risk-shifting). In the low subsidy
regime a repayment rate of 4% is too low to cover all outstanding debts since the debt-gap is
91%. From table 10.1 we can see that a tax of 4.4% is sufcient to get the debt gap at 100%.
Similarly, for the high subsidy regime, we see that the debt gap is 118%, so that the repayment
rate covers more than all outstanding debts. From table 10.1 follows that a repayment rate of
2.9% is sufcient to cover debts.
In table 10.4 we did some sensitivity analyses for the ICL scheme for different assumptions of
the parameter values used in the base-line calculations. Here we use the middle subsidy regime.
The low subsidy regime features qualitatively similar effects. Again, the results show large
sensitivity with respect to the growth rate of wages and the (macro) risk-premium chosen. A 1%
point change in the `good' direction in either one these parameters ensures that the debt gap is
about 100% or even higher. Similar effects are found if the amount borrowed is 25% lower (no
drop-outs) or students are enrolled for the nominal duration of their study. However, a change in
the `wrong direction' makes the system vulnerable to non-repayment. This also holds for 25%
more funds. The labour supply effects (elasticities and retirement ages) have again relatively
modest effects. From the gures for government savings we see that it ranges from 0.5 to 1.6
50Table 10.2 ICL with (partial) risk shifting (s = 2;119 euro)
Gap Count Average Loss x 1000 euro Gross savings Revenue loss Net savings
r t (%) (%) years repay H. voc. Univ. (bln euro) (bln euro) (bln euro)
.00 .02 45 6 44 3.7 3.3 0.7 0.2 0.5
.02 .02 46 - - 3.7 3.2 0.8 0.2 0.5
.04 .02 46 - - 3.7 3.2 0.8 0.2 0.5
¥ .02 46 - - 3.7 3.2 0.8 0.2 0.5
.00 .03 62 19 39 2.8 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.9
.02 .03 67 6 42 2.5 1.5 1.4 0.4 1.0
.04 .03 69 1 48 2.5 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.0
¥ .03 69 - - 2.5 1.4 1.4 0.4 1.0
.00 .04 73 34 37 2.0 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.0
.02 .04 82 18 39 1.6 0.4 1.8 0.5 1.3
.04 .04 89 6 41 1.3 -0.2 2.0 0.5 1.5
¥ .04 91 - - 1.2 -0.5 2.1 0.5 1.6
Table 10.3 ICL with (partial) risk shifting (s = 4;237 euro)
Gap Count Average Loss x 1000 euro Gross savings Revenue loss Net savings
r t (%) (%) years repay H. voc. Univ. (bln euro) (bln euro) (bln euro)
.00 .02 62 19 39 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.5
.02 .02 67 6 42 1.7 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.5
.04 .02 69 1 48 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.6
¥ .02 69 - - 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.6
.00 .03 78 42 36 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.6
.02 .03 89 20 36 0.8 -0.1 1.2 0.4 0.8
.04 .03 97 9 39 0.5 -0.6 1.4 0.4 1.0
¥ .03 103 - - 0.3 -1.0 1.5 0.8 1.1
.00 .04 87 91 34 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.6
.02 .04 102 36 34 0.0 -0.6 1.5 0.5 1.0
.04 .04 116 18 33 -0.2 -1.5 1.8 0.5 1.2
¥ .04 137 - - -1.0 -2.8 2.1 0.5 1.6
51billion euro. So the earlier conclusion that one needs to be careful with drawing inferences is
also conrmed here.
Table 10.4 Sensitivity analysis ICL (r = :02, s = 4;237 euro, t = :03)
Gap Count Average Loss x 1000 euro Gross savings Revenue loss Net savings
(%) (%) years repay H.voc. Univ. (bln eur) (bln eur) (bln. euro)
Baseline 89 20 36 0.8 -0.1 1.2 0.3 0.8
g = :01 ( r = :04) 75 10 37 1.4 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6
g = :03( r = :02) 103 34 36 0.2 -0.7 1.5 0.5 1.0
p = :02 / r = :05 62 6 40 2.1 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.4
p = :01 / r = :04 75 11 38 1.4 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6
Ret. age = 70 95 24 38 0.6 -0.4 1.3 0.4 0.9
Elasticity high 88 19 36 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.8 0.4
Elasticity low 90 20 36 0.7 -0.1 1.2 0.0 1.2
+25% funds 77 11 39 1.6 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.5
-25% funds 103 36 34 0.1 -0.5 1.5 0.4 1.1
Nominal duration 99 34 35 0.3 -0.4 1.4 0.4 1.0
5211 Discussion
11.1 Enrolment effects
Although we have taken into account various possibilities that may affect behaviour it is possible
that other effects are important. Decreasing the subsidy rates and increasing the repayment
obligations through the tax after graduation may cause a drop in enrolment in higher education
because students are confronted with lower returns on their investment in education. On the
other hand, since there is effective insurance of repayment risks, enrolment is expected to
increase. A priori, we cannot quantify the combined effect since both effects work in opposite
direction.
Empirically, evidence on the effects of reducing future earnings on enrolment is mixed.
Estimates for the Netherlands by Kodde (1986) suggest that enrolment is hardly price-responsive.
Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) nd no effects in a similar study for the Netherlands. Empirical
evidence for other countries - notably the US - suggests that increasing tuition rates could reduce
enrolment in higher education. However, empirical evidence is mixed in the US as well.
Leslie and Brinkman (1987) and Hilmer (1998) nd a substantial impact of lowering tuition
prices upon enrolment. Kane's (1994, 1995) ndings suggest that this effect is substantially
lower. In table 11.1 we summarise the enrolment elasticities found in the literature. The elasticity
is dened as the absolute change in enrolment in %-points (dq) with respect to an increase in
tuition prices with 1% (dp=p), i.e., e   dq=(dp=p). It is therefore more correctly denoted a
quasi-elasticity. We computed the elasticities using information on the average prices of
college/university education and the estimated effects upon enrolment in university or college.
Table 11.1 Enrolment (quasi) elasticities
dq dp p e
Kodde, 1986, NL .5 272 euro 545 euro .01
Oosterbeek and Webbink, 1995, NL 0 - - 0
Kane, 1994, US 5 $1000 $1200 .06
Kane, 1995, US 3.5 $1000 $753 .03
Leslie and Brinkman, 1987 (various) .6 - .8 $100 $3420 .21 - .27
Hilmer, 1998 1 $100 $3576 .36
Table 11.1 shows for the US studies that increases in the tuition rates with equal amounts resulted
in roughly equal decreases in enrolment. However, the quasi-elasticities turn out to be very
different since the mean levels of tuition - given in the third column - vary heavily. Kane's
ndings are about ten times lower than Leslie and Brinkman's ndings. This suggests a highly
non-linear relationship between tuition prices and enrolment: the higher is the tuition, the more
enrolment is affected by increases in tuition.
53The level of tuition fees in the Netherlands corresponds more to the Kane's (1994, 1995) analysis
where effects on college enrolment are estimated. Hilmer (1998) and Leslie and Brinkman
(1987) look at university enrolment. Based on the low elasticities of enrolment in the
Netherlands, combined with the tuition levels in the Netherlands that are comparable to Kane's
studies, we are inclined to think that the enrolment elasticity is somewhere between zero and .03.
The latter corresponds to a drop in enrolment of 3% points if current tuition levels are doubled.
Additional evidence based on subjective evaluation by students also suggests that effects upon
enrolment are not very large, see also SEO (2000).
We present some suggestive calculations of the consequences for enrolment for the various
subsidy regimes in table 11.2 based on elasticities in the interval (.01;.03). In the regimes where
students are confronted with all costs, an average price increase of 687% occurs. Based on the
presumed elasticities, a drop in enrolment occurs of 7%-points to 21%-points in the regime with
the highest elasticity of enrolment. For the regimes s = 2;119 euro changes in enrolment are
5-15%-points whereas the s = 4;237 euro regime features drops in enrolment ranging from
3-9%-points. Increasing the private contributions for students to 25% of current total outlays
gives small effects on enrolment. Clearly, potential effects on enrolment can be important. When
considering a policy switch towards more private contributions in higher education, it would
therefore be wise to increase private contributions only slowly and, at the same time, monitor the
development of enrolment rates, especially among the disadvantaged groups.
Given that there are potential repercussions on enrolment, also savings on government
outlays may be larger than presumed.
Table 11.2 Potential effects on enrolment
dp=p (%) dq (%)
e = :01 e = :02 e = :03
s = 0 euro 687 6.9 13.7 20.6
s = 2;119 euro 490 4.9 9.8 14.7
s = 4;237 euro 294 2.9 5.9 8.8
s = 6;355 euro 67 .7 1.3 2.0
Chapman (1997) shows that the introduction of the Australian HECS system did not produce
negative effects on the enrolment of the lower income groups, see also CPB (2001a) for a more
detailed discussion. Furthermore, in the Netherlands we have seen that enrolment has been
steadily increasing in recent years despite lower grants and higher tuition rates. Other factors
seem to be more relevant to explain this observation. Hereby one can think of increases in real
incomes by parents and students (working while studying) which may have caused relaxations of
credit constraints, an increased preference for education as a consumption good, or an
anticipated future increase in real returns on education, see also Leslie and Brinkman (1987) for
54more arguments.
Whether a drop in enrolment is a social disadvantage or not depends on both positive and
adverse selection effects. A positive selection effect occurs because enrolment of marginal
students falls since they are confronted more heavily with the real costs of education. Adverse
selection occurs if low-risk students do not want to participate anymore and if students choose
more risky education types.
11.2 General equilibrium effects
If enrolment effects are important, then general equilibrium repercussions on wages and
interest rates could be important as well. With respect to general equilibrium effects on the
interest rate there is not an issue because the Netherlands is a small open economy in which the
interest rate is determined on world capital markets.
Under perfect factor price equalisation, the relative wages of skilled viz a viz unskilled
workers are determined on world factor markets, see also Topel (1999). Consequently, in a
small-open economy with perfectly integrated capital and/or goods markets there are in principle
no effects on relative wages. However, one can be sceptical about the strength of factor price
equalisation from an empirical point of view. The work by for example Hartog et al. (1993)
suggests that relative wage differences are importantly determined by (local) demand and supply
factors.
Hence, changes in relative wages, and therefore wage proles, might occur as a consequence
of different enrolment decisions of students, see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Heckman et al.
(1998). This changes the income distribution and the incentives to acquire skills. More research
with general equilibrium models as in Heckman et al. (1998) is needed to address this issue.
However, we do not think that general equilibrium effects are very large in view of the low price
elasticity of enrolment.
11.3 Adverse selection and moral hazard effects
With the risk pooling arrangements in the nancing system, the standard problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard with providing an insurance may arise. If the government cannot
observe the riskiness of the type of student, adverse selection might occur if the good risk
students do not want participate in the program, see also Nerlove (1975) and Oosterbeek (1998).
The good risks can be better off by not participating since they have to pay a part of their incomes
as a premium to cover to costs of default of the bad risks. The consequence is that the proportion
of risky students in the total pool of students increases and the repayment rates increase
accordingly. As the `insurance' premium increases, the attractiveness of the GT or ICL system is
reduced for the bad risks. Investment in human capital is reduced because the low risk students
55voluntarily under-insure themselves.
If the government cannot perfectly observe the actions of students and graduates moral
hazard occurs. We may distinguish between a number of types of moral hazard. First, there is
moral hazard relating to the risks of not earning a high enough income after graduation.
Graduates may reduce their labour supply or work effort, even stop participating in the labour
market, or switch to the black circuit in order to reduce or avoid the income contingent
repayments. We take these effects into account in this paper, by considering effects of the
repayment rate on life-time labour supply. Moral hazard could also be relevant for partners who
want to raise children after they graduated rather than work. Based on our calculations we do not
expect that this second form of moral hazard is of quantitative importance for repayment
conditions.
Second, students are better informed about their capabilities and efforts to graduate than the
government. Moral hazard occurs if the system with insurance of repayment risks induces
students to reduce their learning efforts. Since students know that the costs of default are borne
by their fellow students, there is a reduced incentive to study and there is too much risky
borrowing accordingly. This drives up default premiums, and, consequently make the GT/ICL
system less attractive. In turn, lower learning efforts may induce or worsen adverse selection
problems, since worsening repayment conditions make the low risks to opt out.
Third, a form of moral hazard occurs if the repayment rate is not properly differentiated
according to length of study. If repayments are not differentiated the graduates who are enrolled
shortly, subsidise those who are enrolled longer. For a proper functioning of an ICL or GT, the
repayment conditions should be dependent on length of enrolment to avoid distortions in
education choices. Similarly, there is a case for differentiating costs of education for various
education types to avoid implicit subsidies from cheap to expensive studies.
Fourth, education is not only a pure investment good but also features consumption and
immaterial benets, see also Lazear (1977) and Kodde and Ritzen (1985). Students with stronger
preference for the immaterial aspects of education are perhaps also the students in more risky
education types. If this is so, then nancing education with full risk pooling implies that the
agents with more preference for the immaterial aspects of education are implicitly subsidised by
the agents with stronger investment motives. Education choices are distorted then and
enrolment of consumption oriented students is inefciently high.
The importance of adverse selection and moral hazard problems is hard to assess empirically.
No real empirical evidence exists on the impact of the terms of the loan system on the
risk-characteristics of the students involved in the system. The fact that no well developed capital
market for education investments exists can be taken as an indication for the importance of
asymmetric information. For example Rothshield and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that
competitive markets may fail to exist under conditions of asymmetric information. If the
government attempts to correct this market distortion, it can be confronted with similar
56information problems as the private market.
On the other hand, there are legal restrictions that prevent the proper functioning of private
markets. In a non-slave state, claims on human capital cannot be traded. However, if there were
no legal barriers, private markets would probably offer equity contracts rather than debt contracts
for nancing education, see Jacobs and Van Wijnbergen (2002). Since the government is the
only legal authority to execute claims on human capital through the tax system, it can in fact
resolve private market failures by nancing investment in human capital through an equity
participation scheme and recoup returns of the investment through the tax system. For similar
reasons, insurance contracts cannot be executed by private parties. In addition, large transaction
costs are involved in providing loans for education purposes since there is no collateral and
enforcement of repayments is costly. Furthermore, these contracts may be costly from an
administrative point of view given their long duration as indicated by our calculations. The
government is arguably more efcient in enforcing and monitoring the repayments of the loan
through the tax system. Monitoring and enforcement systems are already in place anyhow, so
marginal costs of collecting repayments through the tax system go to zero.
The government may alleviate problems with asymmetric information in various ways. First,
and most important is to generate more information on the risk characteristics, abilities and
motivations of students. In general, the government is confronted with similar moral hazard
problems as the private sector, unless it can gather the information on the `rotten apples' in the
system more efciently that private parties. As stated above, repayment conditions should be
dependent on easily observable characteristics such as length of enrolment and potentially also
on the costs of education. Further, the government could select students upon enrolment and
track them thereafter. The tracking is already a part of government policies (`temponorm').
Thereby the government circumvents the information problem that lies at the heart of the moral
hazard mechanism. This may reduce problems with adverse selection as well. If the government
can get the high risk students out of the student population, the low risk students voluntary
participate, see also Oosterbeek (1998). Also, the repayments my be differentiated for graduates
with different expected life-time earnings to avoid pure income redistribution, while at the same
time maintaining income insurance for graduates within the same income categories. This
requires that there is a sufcient number of graduates within each income category to make risk
pooling possible.
Second, the effective insurance of the ICL can be reduced. The type of contract with adverse
selection is that the low risk (high ability) students voluntarily under-insure themselves, or, in
other words, they bear more risk. Similarly, the solution to moral hazard problems is to provide
less insurance in order to strengthen economic incentives. Nerlove (1975) proposes a xed limit
on the default premium, so that repayments are never larger than principal plus interest plus the
default premium. This is a so called opting-out provision. The possibility of opting out, provides
incentives to the low risk students to participate in the program, so that adverse selection can be
57avoided to some extent. Further, moral hazard problems are mitigated since the benets of loss
preventing efforts are increased. An opting out provision is not a free solution because it has a
price in terms of less effective insurance. Therefore, the under-investment problem due to
lacking insurance, which the government attempted to solve in the rst place, reappears if
insurance is reduced.
The government may also offer multiple `loan-insurance'-packages to different students.
Then students can voluntarily choose the package that suits them best. Again, low-risk students
want a package with less insurance and low default and solidarity premiums, whereas the high
risk students want to have more insurance. This is similar to the opting-out provision. With
multiple contracts potential problems may arise with horizontal equity. Some may regard
multiple contracts as unjust if the type of contracts that students choose is potentially dependent
on background characteristics. These may determine, for example, risk-aversion, and thereby the
type of contract chosen. Principles of equality of opportunity are violated then.
Third, if the costs of default are borne by society, repayment conditions are independent of
the risk-characteristics, preferences and abilities of the students. Low risk/high ability
consumption students are not confronted with the costs of default of high risk/low ability
students. This is the case in the Australian HECS system. Note however that this is not a real
`solution', since the average tax payer is confronted with the risks of default and the problem is
simply shifted to other parties than students. There might be case for subsidies on education if
moral hazard problems are reduced if people become more educated. For example, supplying
less labour to avoid the repayment, has larger utility costs if one is higher educated and wage
rates per hour are higher. Therefore, subsidising education may help to boost labour supply, and
thereby reduce the moral hazard problem of low labour supply. This is what Arnott and Stiglitz
(1990) call a `non-pecuniary markets externality'. Fourth, participation may be obligatory so that
low risk students have no choice of opting out and adverse selection does not occur. Most
proposals of GT seem to assume that participation is indeed obligatory. This eliminates the
adverse selection problem because the low risk students are obliged to participate, but introduces
inefciencies of obligatory redistribution from low risk - high return to high risk - low return
students. These cross-subsidies may exacerbate the moral hazard problems  enrolment of too
many high risk - low return students.
11.4 Positive selection effects
Some types of education clearly have higher monetary benets than others, see also table 4.2. If
private contributions are increased, not only the low risk graduates drop out of the system
(adverse selection), but also the students with the lowest mean returns. This is what we call
positive selection. These are the `marginal students'. Since these students are confronted more
with the real costs, enrolment of these groups tends to fall. If this is true, the average return to
58education in the student population increases, so that repayment conditions in the system
become more attractive.
Again, consumption and immaterial benets may matter. Students with stronger preferences
for consumption and immaterial aspects of education are probably also the students in low
return education types, see also table 4.2. One cannot explain why students pursue a low return
study if there is no apparent non-economic benet instead. We observe lower incomes of
workers with particular types of education (say, art historians) compared to other workers with
other education types (say, economists). Thus, incentives to enrol in types of education with
more consumption and immaterial benets are reduced if private contributions are increased,
because these students are confronted with larger costs. If there are no convincing other reasons
to subsidise education of non-economic oriented students, social efciency is enhanced. Again,
given the absence of any empirical evidence on these matters we cannot assess the potential
strength of positive selection effects.
11.5 Accessibility effects
The question is whether lowering the subsidies and replacing these with income contingent
repayments harms accessibility for students. At least theoretically there hardly seems to be a case
for this mechanism to be relevant. The reason is threefold. First, the capital market imperfection
is resolved so that every student with sufcient talents is able to obtain the necessary funds to
enrol in education, independently of background conditions. Liquidity constraints for the poor are
therefore avoided.
Second, enrolment of students in education types with low returns may be reduced in view of
the larger private contributions. Low return education types are typically encountered in the
`softer' subjects (arts, languages, etc). If there are no other convincing reasons for subsidising
low return education types, this drop in enrolment, creates a positive selection effects and
actually improves social efciency. The reason is that education in low earning subjects with a
system of education subsidies is apparently too cheap from a private perspective and
over-investment occurs with subsidies.
Third, large risk aversion, as a consequence of low initial wealth, ceases to be a serious
problem, since all downside risks are eliminated. All redistribution of incomes goes in the
direction of graduates with the most risky education types with the largest downside income
risks. This runs counter the idea that providing ICL's or GT's for the nancing of education
imposes serious risks on students in the riskier education types. In fact, the graduates with little
income risks are the ones who bear the costs in a risk-pooling system. These students may drop
out of the system and have to self-nance their investments, cf. Rothshield and Stiglitz (1976).
Low risk graduates opting for self-nancing suffer from problems with imperfect capital markets
and absent insurance, social inefciencies may occur if the low risk students under-invest.
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We did not pay attention to the administrative costs associated with the different proposals for
education nance reform. Available evidence on the income contingent loan system in Australia
suggests that administrative costs were as low as 1% of the total loans repaid, see Chapman
(1997, p. 747). This is low given the complexity of the system. Furthermore, we expect that
savings on administration costs can be made since the (ex ante) income check for income
dependent grants can be abolished, see also Kane (1997, p.347). Additionally, integrating the
repayments of education loans in the tax system makes it possible to save on collection costs.
Marginal costs of including the repayment structure in the income tax are approximately zero.
Furthermore, psychological barriers and compliance costs are lower when repayments are
integrated in the tax system, so we expect that collection costs are low.
11.7 International environment
Some have expressed concerns that if private contributions in higher education are increased, an
outow of students and high skilled workers to foreign countries may take place which is
harmful for the Netherlands. Distortions arise in any scheme where the intertemporal link
between benets and tax contributions is broken. I.e., a moral hazard effect may occur when
academics permanently leave the country after graduation if the repayment rate in a GT or ICL is
a residence based tax that can be avoided by moving to foreign countries.
It is however a matter of political choice to let the repayments in a GT/ICL take the form of a
residence based tax. One may also opt for a source based GT or ICL in similar fashion as an
income contingent loan to avoid the problem. Alternatively, a so called `exit tax' can be applied for
graduates that leave the country.
Note that the government is confronted with people leaving the country, for reasons of
various sorts (including government policy). No matter how the nancing of education is
organised, governments have to deal with international movements of graduates in any case.
This applies as well to, for example, the current loan scheme.
Similarly, nancing conditions could be such that foreign students may be eligible for a
graduate tax or income contingent loan. Again, moral hazard may occur if these graduates return
to their own countries to escape the repayment obligations. This can be solved by basing the
eligibility of the nancing on residence principles, rather than source principles, or applying an
`exit tax'.
Moreover, increasing private contributions could also be a so called `beggar thy neigbour
policy'. Governments may shift the costs of education to foreign countries if students take up
their education abroad, and return after graduation and work in the Netherlands. In that case,
increasing private contributions increases welfare for the Netherlands.
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low (about 2.5% for higher vocational graduates and about 4% for university graduates, see HBO
Raad (1999) and VSNU (2000)). One may therefore argue whether international movements of
students or graduates are of serious quantitative importance, apart from the question whether
the government solves problems with evasion of repayment obligations. Both students and
graduates seems to react hardly to international nancial incentives for a number of reasons.
First, studies on international mobility of labour may shed light to what extent international
mobility is really an issue quantitatively. Moreover, if workers respond to international
differentials in incomes or unemployment rates, students may also be exspected to respond to
international differences in educational costs. Studies like Nahuis and Parikh (2002), and the
references therein, typically nd very low estimates of international labour mobility of workers
within the EU. Based on these ndings, it is unlikely that increasing private contributions will
induce signicant labour movements.
Second, international labour movements are in fact labour supply effects. Therefore,
international mobility effects on tax revenues are captured as well by the tax-elasticity of income.
We took the latter into account in our analysis. Recall that estimates of labour supply elasticities
are typically low and moral hazard in labour supply was not a serious problem in our analysis.
Third, students' potential responses to international differences in education costs is also
indirectly related to the price-elasticity of demand for education. If the price-elasticity of demand
for higher education is indeed rather low, as the gures reported earlier in this paper suggest, one
should be surprised to nd large sensitivity of enrolment with respect to foreign education costs.
Fourth, nancial incentives are apparently to weak to provoke arbitrage ows of labour
migration, since there are important non-nancial factors that severely limit migration such as
language and cultural barriers, social networks, family, relationships, and so on.
6112 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the consequences of replacing government subsidies on
education with a graduate tax (GT) or income contingent loan (ICL) system for the nancing of
higher education. GT's and ICL's are directly directed towards solving the problems with
imperfect capital markets and the absence of insurance to cover the nancial risks of pursuing
higher education. Government resources are therefore directed towards those students facing
problems in nancing their education and being confronted with risks of low incomes after
graduation, i.e., the potentially disadvantaged students/graduates. This is less costly than giving
subsidies across the board. Further, an increase in private contributions by students can be
defended on grounds of achieving a more equal distribution of incomes, to circumvent pressures
on government budgets, and to increase the allocative efciency of the educational system.
In both GT and ICL systems graduates obtain funds by the government to cover tuition and
costs of living. Graduates pay a fraction of their incomes to the government in return for the
funds received. With an ICL the amount of repayments has a maximum that is determined by
the amount borrowed, whereas with a GT payments never stop. If a mark-up on the interest rate,
a so called default or solidarity premium, covers the social losses in an ICL system, there is
risk-pooling of income risks amongst graduates. We showed that the GT is therefore a special
case of an ICL system with a large default/solidarity premium. The reason is that with higher
default/solidarity premiums, the high-earning graduates remain in the system for a longer time
and thereby contribute more to solidarity. The crucial difference between ICL's and GT's is that
under a GT, the amount of income insurance and redistribution of incomes is larger because
there is no ceiling on repayments. With an ICL the social risks may also be borne by society
rather than the graduates. In that case default risks are shifted, which comes at the cost of
achieving less savings on government outlays because (ex post) education subsidies still enter the
system.
To analyse the consequences of a policy switch towards increased private contributions, we
constructed a simulation model to analyse loans, GT's and ICL systems of education nance. We
differentiated the nancing regimes with full pooling, or (partial) risk shifting of default risks.
We based our simulations on empirical estimates of the wage proles of graduates where we
differentiated the graduates according to their gender, whether they pursued higher vocational or
university education, what type of education they did and we allowed for income uncertainty.
Additionally, we adjusted the age-earnings proles for labour supply and participation effects.
We analysed increases in private contributions by students from the current system to the
abolition of all current education subsidies. A pure loan system served as a benchmark.
Especially women run into repayment problems in a loan system if education subsidies are low.
Also graduates in the low earning subjects would run risks of default. We have shown that the
switch to a GT or ICL system can signicantly reduce the default risks that graduates would
62experience if they had to nance their education under an ordinary loan system. This implies
that the insurance element in an GT/ICL schemes is crucial. Notwithstanding that also
redistribution of incomes takes place.
To get a quantitative idea of the effects, a net reduction in yearly government outlays on
education of about 2.5 billion euro would result if education current subsidies are dropped to
zero. The repayment rate in an GT is then about 6%. In an ICL system with full risk pooling -
with a maximum of repayments by students - the repayment rate is higher depending on the
ceiling of the repayments. The range varies from 6-10% depending on the size of the
default/solidarity premium. If default risks are shifted to society the repayment rate may be
lower, but this goes at a costs of a smaller reduction in government outlays. Increasing the
contribution by students to about 50% of the costs would result in a GT of about 3%, and
somewhat higher repayment rates in an ICL system with full risk pooling. Still a reduction in
government outlays results of about 1.1 billion euro.
Under a risk-shifting regime, the government faces a trade-off between reducing ex ante
subsidies on education subsidies on the one hand, and nancing the costs of non-repayment (ex
post subsidies) on the other hand. Nevertheless, replacing ex ante subsidies with ex post
subsidies makes the resulting distribution of incomes more equal than in the current system
since only graduates with insufcient incomes to repay their debts in full receive subsidies,
whereas in the current system also graduates with potentially high enough incomes to repay
their debts receive subsidies. Whether the government wants to give ex ante or ex post subsidies
depends on the trade-off between equity/insurance and efciency/incentives. Ex post subsidies
are more equal, but less efcient because education and labour supply choices are distorted.
Our calculations of an income contingent loan system with repayment rates of 3% indicate
that repayment periods are generally long (about 30 years or more) and that a substantial fraction
of the graduates may not repay their debts in full. This is circumstantial evidence that the private
sector is reluctant to provide education loans since administration and enforcement costs are
high, whereas these problems are arguably less severe for the government when the repayment
schedule is integrated in the tax system.
We took into account potential effects of the repayment rate on life-time labour supply and
considered changes in the retirement age. These turned out not to be very important for the
repayment conditions. Consequently, moral hazard effects regarding labour supply are not very
important quantitatively. Nevertheless, net savings on government expenditures are importantly
determined by the sensitivity of taxable labour income with respect to the repayment rate. The
reason is that the government also looses tax revenues when labour supply is reduced. This can
be mainly attributed to the fact that savings on government outlays are not rebated through for
example lower taxes. The latter policy may substantially mitigate the adverse revenue effects of
increasing private contributions.
Further, we investigated the potential effects of reducing the average duration of enrolment
63and the reduction of drop-out rates. These turned out to make the system substantially more
attractive in terms of repayment conditions. This is important in light of avoiding moral hazard
and adverse selection effects. We have also shown that the results are sensitive with respect to the
assumptions regarding interest rates, default and risk premiums and growth rates of wages. So
one has to be careful in drawing rm conclusions about the exact size of the repayment rates.
We discussed potential effects of raising private contributions upon enrolment in higher
education and concluded that enrolment may decrease. We do not expect that enrolment of
students with sufcient talents will decrease, but the `marginal' students may choose not to
pursue higher education. The enrolment effects are probably not very large, but empirical
evidence is not very robust to vindicate this conclusion. Therefore, it seems most practical to
increase private contributions only gradually while at the same time monitoring enrolment.
We do not expect that increasing private contributions will have any signicant effects on
international movements of graduates. And, in the case there are potential movements of
graduates, there are solutions to deal with its consequences (source based repayments, or `exit'
taxes).
Finally, when a policy switch is made, a choice must be made with regards to who bears the
costs of default: graduates (risk-pooling), the government (risk-shifting), or a mixture of both? If
moral hazard, adverse selection and adverse incentive effects (arising from redistribution) can be
avoided by means of selection and tracking mechanisms, making the repayment rates dependent
on length of enrolment, the type of study and expected life-time earnings, there seems to be no
need for the government to share the costs of default with the students.
However, if adverse selection/incentives and moral hazard are indeed important, the
government can avoid the repercussions on repayment conditions by bearing (partially) the costs
of default. This has the advantage that repayment conditions are independent from the
risk-characteristics of the student population so that adverse selection is avoided, but may
exacerbate moral hazard problems (high drop-out, long duration of enrolment). Further, savings
on government outlays are less since education subsidies still enter the system in ex post fashion.
Obligatory participation by students may also mitigate adverse selection effects. Adverse
incentives can also be avoided by giving less insurance/income redistribution.
Problems with adverse incentives and asymmetric information are potentially more
important in a GT system than an ICL system, because there is more insurance/redistribution in
a GT compared to an ICL. More generally, the ICL features more degrees of freedom than a GT,
so that policy targets are achieved more efciently under an ICL.
64Appendix A List of assumptions
 Growth rate of wages g = :02. Robustness checks for g = :01 and g = :03.
 Real risk free interest rate r = :03 per year. Robustness checks for r = :01, r = :02, r = :04, and
r = :05.
 No risk premium in base-line calculations. Robustness checks for p = :01 and p = :02.
 Default/solidarity premiums ICL r = 0, r = :02, r = 04, r = ¥ (latter is equivalent to graduate
tax with risk-shifting).
 No differentiation according tot differences in educational costs. Differentiation according to
level of education (higher vocational/university) and length of education (b and medical
education tracks).
 Flat repayment rate. Repayments not differentiated according to type of education, subject of
education or sex. We do not allow for faster repayments than necessary. No income checks in
general and no specic income checks for non-participants or part-time workers.
 Students receive funds equal to the current education expenditures on institutions and grants per
student per year minus exogenously given education subsidies at level s euro. We vary average
subsidy levels between s = 0 euro, s = 2;119 euro, s = 4;237 euro, and s = 6;355 euro. The
current average subsidy level equals s = 7;398 euro
 Amount of funds exogenous. Robustness checks for +25% or -25% in total funds made available
to students.
 Average duration higher vocational education 5 years. Average duration university education
sciences and technical subjects 6 years, medical 7 years and other 5 years.
 Slopes earnings proles invariant to education subject and labour supply effects. Slopes differ for
men and women and higher vocational and university education.
 Risk classes based on estimated standard errors of residuals of wage proles. Wages are assumed
to be log-normally distributed.
 Participation index takes into account hours worked (differentiated by age and higher vocational
or university education) participation rates (differentiated by higher vocational or university
education), and growth in participation rates.
 Participation index L = Lage=26 if age < 26, L = Lage=55 if age > 55. Retirement age 65.
Robustness checks for a retirement age of 70 years.
 All calculations based on 1997 gures except corrections for growth in participation rates.
 The model is assumed to be in the steady state and no general equilibrium effects are present
(small open economy).
 q = :5 is the average marginal tax rate which is assumed to be constant. Average tax rate is
assumed to be constant at .40.
 Uncompensated elasticity of life-time labour supply in base scenario: men E = :1, women E = :5.
High scenario: men E = :25, women E = 1. Low scenario: men E = 0 women E = 0.
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To estimate the earnings proles we use data from 1997 on wages and education provided by the
Statistics Netherlands (2000b) in the Wage Structure Survey 1997 (Statistics Netherlands,
Loonstructuur Onderzoek (LSO) 1997). This data set contains information on earnings,
education levels, work experience, job characteristics, etc. for working males and females. The
total number of observations is about 150.000. We only use data on higher educated workers,
which leaves us with about 35.000 observations.1
Wages are gross monthly earnings. For the estimation of the earnings proles we computed
hourly wages based on reported hours of work. Then hourly wages are converted into yearly
wages by multiplying hourly wage rates with a measure of total hours worked in a year based on
full-time employment. We take for this measure 1600 hours which is derived from a working
year consisting of 40 weeks of 40 hours of work.2 We use the log of the yearly wage in our
estimations in conformity with the literature, see e.g. Becker (1993).
Statistics Netherlands provides data on education levels that are based on the standard
education classication (Standaard Onderwijs Indeling), see also Statistics Netherlands (1993).
For our purposes we transform the education classication to the so called HOOP classication
used by the Dutch Ministry of Education (HOOP is an abbreviation of the Higher Education and
Research Plan). This classication consists of eight aggregate subjects for university education:
agriculture, sciences, technical, health, economics, law, behavioural and social subjects, and
languages and culture. For higher vocational education essentially the same categories are used.
For higher vocational education we use an extra category for education to become a teacher and
we drop the sciences category.3
Next, we adjust the estimated earnings proles for differences in labour supply. To that end
we employ additional data. First, we use data from the Labour Force Survey 1997 (Statistics
Netherlands, Enquete Beroepsbevolking (EBB) 1997) conducted by Statistics Netherlands
(2000c) on labour force participation. Participation rates are dened as the fraction of the
(random) sample that belongs to the working population, i.e., persons that are either working, or
planning to be working, or actively searching for work for at least 12 hours a week. We were not
able to disentangle the effects further to the various types of education as the EBB only uses a
classication of technical, economic, health and other types of education.
Second, we use data on hours worked. These are also taken from the LSO'97 data provided by
Statistics Netherlands (2000b). We take as a measure of labour supply the total hours worked in
a year. Third, we adjust the earnings proles for increases in labour force participation. An
1 We excluded post-doctoral workers.
2 Average labour supply for males at the university (higher vocational level) equals 1566 (1551) hours per year, see
table D.1. Therefore, we think that 1600 hours is a good approximation for a full-time job.
3 We constructed a concordance between both classications that is available upon request from the author.
66update of the data provided by the Statistics Netherlands/CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic
Policy Research (1997) is used to project growth in participation rates.
For the computations of the various policy experiments we use data on enrolment in higher
education by type of education, HOOP-classication and gender from Statistics Netherlands
(1999). Further we added data on the costs of education per student (grants, cost prices of
education, and tuition rates) in various HOOP area's provided by the Dutch Ministry of
Education (2000, 2001).
67Appendix C Estimation earnings proles
We estimate earnings proles of graduates separately for men and women, and for higher
vocational and university education. We adjust these wage proles by taking into account labour
supply decisions, participation rates, and the growth in participation rates, to correct the future
earnings streams of graduates. In our analysis we differentiate between various types of
education. It is expected that earnings proles differ for the various subjects that students have
chosen.
We estimate standard OLS regressions of Z-th order polynomial age-earnings proles with












where the dependent variable is the log of yearly gross wage income.1 dum j is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if education type is j = 1;:::;8. (Note that we drop one dummy for the last category in
the estimations). expj is years of working experience. a and b are the parameter vectors to be
estimated. e is an error term.
Murphy and Welch (1992) argue that a quadratic wage prole misses some essential aspects
of the age earnings prole. Therefore, we estimate a more exible functional form with higher
order terms. In order to determine the degree of the polynomial function we rst estimated a
age-earnings prole over the whole sample with age-dummies for every age. On the basis of this
estimation we computed the predicted wage prole. Next we estimated a Z-th order polynomial
prole and computed the predicted wages. We compared the predictions of both wage proles
and found that after the fourth order only marginal improvements in predictions were found.
Lower order wage proles turned to miss essential characteristics at the tails, i.e., at low or high
levels of experience.
We do not estimate separate slope coefcients on experience for each education type since the
number of observations in each `age-type' cell is too low to obtain precise estimates on the
experience terms. Only by reducing the number of estimated coefcients for experience to a
quadratic wage prole one can obtain relatively precise estimates. This procedure has a large cost
because a quadratic wage prole does not represent the actual pattern of life-cycle incomes very
well. Consequently, we chose to do a xed effects estimation.
We dene the experience variable as follows. We subtracted from age, the approximate age at
which the labour market is entered. We assumed that each higher vocational graduate starts to
work at the age of 22. This is based on the notion that secondary education to enter higher
vocational education (HAVO) ends at age 17 and the presumed duration of higher vocational
education is 5 years. University graduates start one year later at the age of 23, since secondary
1 Note that the yearly gross wage is a linear transformation of hourly wage rates (based on 1600 hours per year) so
that labour supply effects do not enter here.
68education to enter university takes one year longer (VWO). We maintain the assumption that it
takes 5 years to complete an university education except for three education types. University
graduates with a beta-education (science or technical) start to work at the age of 24 and university
graduates with a medical education start working at age 25. The latter exceptions reect the
respective longer durations of their education.
Table C.1 gives the estimation results for men and women with higher vocational and
university education types respectively. In general, our variables of interest are highly signicant
at conventional condence levels.
Table C.1 Estimation results. Dependent variable is log yearly wage.
Higher vocational University
men women men women
Agriculture 0.119 0.052 0.27 0.166
(0.023)*** -0.051 (0.034)*** (0.057)***
Sciences 0.245 0.165
(0.027)*** (0.046)***
Technics 0.207 0.006 0.365 0.288
(0.012)*** -0.031 (0.024)*** (0.051)***
Medical 0.075 -0.064 0.335 0.219
(0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.033)*** (0.035)***
Economics 0.251 -0.011 0.383 0.225
(0.011)*** -0.016 (0.024)*** (0.039)***
Law 0.126 -0.023 0.351 0.186
(0.023)*** -0.038 (0.028)*** (0.034)***
Social & behavioural 0.057 -0.066 0.088 0.077
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)***
Teacher -0.066 -0.143
(0.025)*** (0.033)***
Exp 0.157 0.163 0.135 0.146
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)***
Exp2/100 -0.856 -1.157 -0.669 -0.912
(0.061)*** (0.069)*** (0.108)*** (0.165)***
Exp3/10000 2.297 3.499 1.748 2.618
(0.241)*** (0.297)*** (0.418)*** (0.715)***
Exp4/1000000 -2.300 -3.695 -1.727 -2.675
(0.315)*** (0.414)*** (0.541)*** (1.020)***
Constant 2.865 3.072 2.992 3.089
(0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.039)*** (0.043)***
s.e.e. .448 .526 .428 .48
Observations 13560 11113 5664 3050
R-squared 0.33 0.19 0.36 0.22
Standard errors in parentheses.
* signicant at10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***signicant at 1%.
Note: Teacher is the reference subject for higher vocational education. Arts, culture and languages is the reference subject for university education.
69Appendix D Labour supply effects
We correct the wage proles for differences in working time, participation rates, and growth in
participation rates.
D.1 Hourly labour supply
Table D.1 shows the average number of hours worked per year ordered by education type for men
and women respectively. The rst thing to notice is that labour supply for males is by and large
the same for various subjects at the higher vocational levels. Inspection of the gures reveals that
men work approximately full-time. The only exception is the category `arts' where labour supply
is substantially lower. A similar pattern for men can be found at the university levels of education.
Table D.1 Yearly labour supply in hours by type of education.
Men Women
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
Agriculture 1569 1626 1308 1359
Science 1606 1273
Technical 1625 1646 1275 1586
Medical 1444 1542 1106 1305
Economics 1610 1630 1384 1513
Law 1502 1599 1161 1449
Social & behavioural 1473 1459 1189 1199
Arts 1146 1016
Lang. & cult. 1428 1231
Teachers 1512 1129
Average 1551 1566 1185 1288
Source: Statistics Netherlands (LSO, 1997).
As expected, women work less hours than men both at the university and the higher vocational
education levels. At higher vocational level labour supply is about 15-20%-points lower, whereas
somewhat smaller differences with men are found at the university levels of education. Again,
labour supply is the lowest in the arts category. Female labour supply for the classes agriculture,
sciences, technical, economics and law is systematically higher than for the `softer' categories
health, behavioural and social, arts, languages and culture and teachers.
D.2 Hourly labour supply over the life-cycle
Table D.2 shows labour supply for various age-classes. These gures are not surprising either.
Male labour supply increases at the beginning of the life-cycle, and drops after the age of 55 for
both higher vocational and university education. Figures for female hourly labour supply show
70that the drop in labour supply occurs around the age of 35 years, whereas it remains relatively
constant thereafter.
Table D.2 Yearly labour supply in hours by age.
Men Women
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
age  25 1122 1447 1132 1222
25 < age  35 1581 1613 1292 1382
35 < age  45 1591 1597 1117 1218
45 < age  55 1594 1550 1160 1166
age > 55 1484 1435 1008 1231
average 1551 1566 1185 1288
Source: Statistics Netherlands (LSO, 1997).
D.3 Participation
The labour supply gures were based on working individuals only. However, we have to correct
for labour force participation as well, since not everyone is working after graduation due to
voluntary exit from the labour market or unemployment. Table D.3 shows participation rates for
men and women at higher vocational and university education for various age classes.
Table D.3 Participation rates by age.
Men Women
Higher vocational University Higher vocational University
age < 25 .60 .80 .71 .77
25 < age  35 .93 .93 .80 .85
35 < age  45 .97 .96 .69 .80
45 < age  55 .92 .93 .64 .75
age > 55 .39 .54 .23 .45
average .85 .89 .67 .79
Source: Statistics Netherlands (EBB, 1997).
The pattern in table D.3 is well known. Labour force participation rst increases and then
decreases with age. For men the substantial drop in participation rates occurs after the age of 55,
whereas for women a rst drop occurs at the age of 35, and then a second drop in participation
can be seen at the age of 55. Labour force participation rates for men at higher vocational and
university education are roughly comparable. The differences lie in the fact that men at
university levels of education start to participate earlier and remain to participate at higher rates
when they are old.
71The latter observation also holds for women. University educated women participate more when
young and older. The major reason for the relatively low participation rate of women with higher
vocational education is due to the fact that the rst drop in labour force participation (at the age
of 35) is much larger than for women with university education.
Projections for the future reveal that labour force participation rates increase. Only modest
increases in labour supply of men are expected in the early years of the 21th century that level off,
later on. For women the increases are more substantial. Figure D.1, based on Statistics
Netherlands/CPB (1997), shows these trends.
Figure D.1 Participation rates 1998-2000











In order to relate the trend in labour supply to our gures of labour force participation we
construct an index (1997=1) of labour force participation. We are not able to differentiate the
aggregate trends in labour force participation between the various education levels, only age
classes. As such, we cannot compare aggregate participation rates with participation rates of
higher educated workers as the latter are much higher than the former. By using an index we
attempt to correct for this trend. This procedure could generate an upward bias in participation
growth because the participation rates of higher educated workers is already high and therefore
probably less likely to increase at the same rate as the aggregate participation rate.
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